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Summary 
This thesis examines the complex legal landscape of situations where the 
national procedural autonomy of EU Member States is affected by the 
general principle of EU law known as the principle of effective judicial 
protection. The meaning of effective judicial protection is unclear in the 
legal doctrine as well as in the case law from the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. It is often linked to the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness, which also limit the national procedural autonomy of the 
Member States, as well as to several statutes in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The discrepancy in the ECJ’s application of the principle of effective 
judicial protection risks a situation of legal uncertainty, problematic for both 
individuals seeking to ensure rights derived from EU law in courts, and for 
Member States seeking to fulfil their obligation to provide effective judicial 
protection of fundamental rights. Since national courts are entrusted with the 
task of applying and upholding EU law this legal uncertainty also risks a 
situation where the principle of effective judicial protection is not applied 
correctly throughout the EU. Therefore, this thesis maps the current legal 
landscape in regard of effective judicial protection by examining its 
development in the case law of the ECJ. The case law developing the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness is also analysed, as is the 
potential codifications of the principle of effective judicial protection in 
Article 19(1) TEU, Articles 47 and 41 of the Charter and Articles 6(1) and 
13 of the ECHR. For the purpose of analysing how the principle of effective 
judicial protection relates to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness 
as well as to the abovementioned statutes the thesis then analyses four 
judgments from the ECJ. Lastly, it examines the purposes of the principle of 
effective judicial protection, and whether the EU is providing sufficient 
protection of them. 
It finds that the principle of effective judicial protection is an independent 
principle that should not be bundled with the principle of effectiveness since 
it has a different legal basis, different characteristics and a different purpose. 
Furthermore, the principle of effective judicial protection is enshrined in 
Article 47 of the Charter, and likely in Article 41 of the Charter and Article 
19(1) TEU. There is also a clear link between the principle of effective 
judicial protection and Articles 6(1) and 13 ECHR, both through established 
case law and through the EU treaties. 
The thesis finds that the purpose behind the principle of effective judicial 
protection is the obligation of EU Member States to secure the protection of 
individual rights derived from EU law. It thus differs somewhat from the 
purpose underlying the principle of effectiveness, which is to secure the 
effectiveness of EU law. It is hard to draw definitive conclusions on the 
adequacy of the ECJ’s protection of this objective, due to a lack of case law. 
The ECJ’s ambiguity in the existing case law is criticised. 
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Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats analyserar det komplexa rättsläget i situationer när principen 
om effektivt rättsskydd, som är en allmän princip inom EU-rätten, påverkar 
medlemsstaternas nationella processautonomi. Det är oklart, såväl i doktrin 
som i EU-rättslig praxis, vad principen om effektivt rättsskydd innebär. Den 
kopplas ofta samman med både likvärdighets- och effektivitetsprinciperna, 
som också begränsar den nationella processautonomin, och med flera 
bestämmelser i Europeiska unionens stadga om de grundläggande 
rättigheterna och i Europeiska konventionen angående skydd för de 
mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna. 
EU-domstolens motsägelsefulla tillämpning av principen om effektivt 
rättsskydd riskerar att skapa rättsosäkerhet både för individer som vill få 
sina rättigheter fastställda av domstol och för medlemsstater som vill 
fullfölja sin skyldighet att säkerställa ett effektivt domstolsskydd av 
grundläggande rättigheter. Eftersom nationella domstolar är ansvariga för att 
tillämpa och upprätthålla EU-rätten riskerar denna rättsosäkerhet också att 
leda till ett rättsläge där principen om effektivt rättsskydd inte tillämpas 
korrekt i hela EU. Därför är syftet med denna uppsats att kartlägga rättsläget 
kring principen om effektivt rättsskydd genom att undersöka dess framväxt i 
praxis. Likvärdighets- och effektivitetsprincipernas framväxt i praxis 
analyseras också, liksom de eventuella kodifikationerna av principen om 
effektivt rättsskydd i artikel 19(1) EUF, artikel 47 och 41 i stadgan och 
artikel 6(1) och 13 i EKMR. Därefter analyseras fyra fall från EU-domstolen 
där domstolen hade möjlighet att tillämpa såväl principerna som deras 
kodifikationer i syfte att undersöka hur principen om effektivt rättsskydd 
förhåller sig till likvärdighets- och effektivitetsprinciperna å ena sidan och 
till de relevanta bestämmelserna i EUF, stadgan och EKMR å andra sidan. 
Slutligen undersöks vilka syften som principen om effektivt rättsskydd 
grundar sig på och huruvida EU-domstolen skyddar dessa syften tillräckligt. 
Uppsatsen kommer fram till att principen om effektivt rättsskydd är en 
självständig princip, som inte ska klumpas ihop med effektivitetsprincipen 
eftersom den har en annan rättslig grund, andra egenskaper och ett annat 
syfte. Principen om effektivt rättsskydd är vidare kodifierad i artikel 47 i 
stadgan och troligtvis också i artikel 41 i stadgan och artikel 19(1) EUF. Det 
finns också en tydlig koppling mellan principen om effektivt rättsskydd och 
artikel 6(1) och 13 i EKMR, både i praxis och i EU-fördragen. 
Uppsatsen finner att syftet med principen om effektivt rättsskydd är 
medlemsstaternas skyldighet att säkerställa ett skydd av individuella 
rättigheter som härstammar från EU-rätten. Det skiljer sig alltså från syftet 
med effektivitetsprincipen som är att säkerställa EU-rättens effektivitet. På 
grund av knapphändig praxis är det svårt att dra några slutgiltiga slutsatser 
om huruvida EU-domstolen skyddar detta syfte tillräckligt. EU-domstolens 
tvetydighet i den praxis som finns kritiseras. 
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1 Introduction  
This thesis sets out to examine the complex legal landscape of situations 
where EU law limits, or at least affects, the national procedural systems of 
its Member States in the pursuit of what is referred to as ‘effective judicial 
protection’, the meaning of which is unclear both in doctrine and in the case 
law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.1 
It is important to bear in mind the special features of the EU procedural 
system. From the very beginning of the EU legal order, it has been the 
responsibility of the Member States to enforce EU law in their pre-existing 
national procedural systems. The Court of Justice2 already in the seventies 
held that in the absence of harmonising EU law the organisation of 
procedural and judicial systems is a competence of the Member States, 
subject only to the limitations of two principles of EU law – the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness.3 As long as national procedural systems 
complied with these requirements, the EU would not interfere even though 
it meant that the remedies for breaches of EU law would be different, 
depending on the national legislation of the Member State in question.4 
Since then, the legal context surrounding national procedural autonomy has 
evolved. The simplified picture of national procedural autonomy only being 
limited by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness is no longer true. 
Now, the legal landscape is significantly more complex for at least three 
reasons. 
Firstly, the regulatory landscape has changed. The CJEU has in its case law, 
parallel to developing the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, 
utilised another principle, namely that of ‘effective judicial protection’. 5 
There is also a multitude of new legal statutes governing procedural 
safeguards of individual rights to consider. The Charter of Fundamental 
rights6 containing Articles 41 (right to good administration) and 47 (right to 
an effective remedy and to a fair trial) is one example. Another example, 
perhaps the most obvious one, is the European Convention on Human 
Rights7, which according to provisions of primary law8, as well as case law 
1 Hereinafter ‘CJEU’, the term used when referring to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union as a whole. When referring specifically to one of the three courts that together 
constitute the CJEU their respective name or abbreviation is used, see Articles 13 and 19 of 
the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter ‘TEU’) establishing the CJEU and its three 
instances. 
2 Hereinafter ‘ECJ’. 
3 Case C-33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für 
das Saarland [1976] ECR 01989 and Case C-45/76 Comet BV v Produktschap voor 
Siergewassen [1976] ECR 02043 and Anthony Arnull, ‘The Principle of Effective Judicial 
Protection in EU Law: an Unruly Horse?’ (2011) 36 EL Rev 51, 51–52. 
4 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (2nd edn OUP 2012) 704. 
5 Case C-14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 
[1984] ECR 01891. 
6 Hereinafter ‘Charter’. 
7 Hereinafter ‘ECHR’. 
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of the ECJ9, must be considered along with the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights.10 Furthermore, the Treaty on European Union11 
that entered into force in 2009 entails Article 19(1), governing ‘effective 
legal protection’ as a responsibility of the Member States. 
The differentiation of these various legal sources can of course be argued to 
be merely a chimera, meaning that all of the mentioned principles and 
statutes represent but different labels for the same right, and that no real 
change of the law has occurred since the seventies. Where there are many 
names there are, however, often many meanings and therefore a risk for 
confusion as to what the substance referred to actually consists of. Given the 
binding, but unclear, relationship between these different principles and 
statutes, ensuring effective judicial protection has become a complicated 
affair. 
Secondly, the CJEU is not the sole interpreter of the legal sources described 
above. The ECJ is, of course, the sole interpreter of EU law as such,12 but it 
is, nonetheless, bound by various other legal sources such as the ECHR and 
other instruments of International law.13 These legal sources have their own 
interpreters, such as for example the ECtHR, responsible for interpreting the 
ECHR. As a result, a case from the ECtHR may change the meaning of the 
principle of effective judicial protection in EU law, without any action from 
the EU legislator or the CJEU. 
Thirdly, the purposes behind the different norms limiting national 
procedural autonomy have evolved. The primary purpose of the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness is to safeguard the effective application of 
Union law.14 This stands in contrast to case law stating that the protective 
purpose of the principle of effective judicial protection is the possibility of 
individuals to ascertain their rights derived from EU law.15 Articles 41 and 
8 Article 6(3) TEU and Articles 52(3) and 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union [2012] OJ C326/391 (hereinafter ‘Charter’). 
9 Case C-4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European 
Communities [1974] ECR 00491, para 13 and Case C-36/75 Roland Rutili v Ministre de 
l'intérieur [1975] ECR 01219, para 32. 
10 Article 52(7) of the Charter, which refers to the Explanations Relating to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, which in turn clarifies in relation to Article 52 that 
also case law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ‘ECtHR’) shall be taken 
into account. 
11 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/13. Hereinafter, 
‘TEU’. 
12 Article 267 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union [2012] OJ C326/47. Hereinafter ‘TFEU’, and case C-314/85 Foto-Frost v 
Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 04199, para 12. 
13 See regarding the ECHR Article 6(3) TEU, and regarding other instruments of 
international law Article 216 TFEU and case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of 
America and Others v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2011] ECR 
I-13755, para 50. The importance of International agreements in regard of the development 
of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law are described in section 4.3.1 below. 
14 Case C-106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] 
ECR 00629, paras 20–23. 
15 Case C-222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
[1986] ECR 01651, para 20. 
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47 of the Charter as well as Articles 6(1) and 13 of the ECHR, similarly set 
out to protect the rights of individuals, as is clear from their wording. 
This scattered image of effective judicial protection raises many questions. 
First and foremost, what does the concept entail? Are there differences 
between the different principles and statutes affecting national procedural 
autonomy? If so, what are they and in which situations should the different 
principles and statutes be applied? 
Once the answers to these questions have been concluded, other questions 
are raised, such as whether or not the current application of these legal 
sources actually protects their intended purposes. 
In sum, the principle of effective judicial protection is a concept that is far 
from clear. The legal framework governing it consists of different legal 
sources, whose meaning and interaction is not fully clarified. This unclear 
image generates a need for mapping the principle of effective judicial 
protection in CJEU case law, as well as in EU legislation, and evaluate 
whether it is sufficiently accomplishing its purpose. 
1.1 Background 
Ever since the early days of the European Union, it has been the task of 
national courts to apply and enforce EU law.16 In the absence of harmonised 
procedural rules, they have been obliged to apply EU law according to their 
respective national procedural systems and as an integral part of their own 
legal system. 
The potential danger of the emergence of a diversified and ineffective 
application of EU law was countered by the adoption of the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness, established by the ECJ in Rewe 17  and 
Comet 18. They have since been confirmed in numerous cases, including 
recent ones showing that they are still valid law.19 In short, the principle of 
equivalence prevents national procedural provisions from discriminating, 
both directly and indirectly, between claims under EU law and similar 
claims under national law.20 The principle of effectiveness prevents national 
rules from making it impossible, or render it excessively difficult, 21  to 
invoke provisions of EU law. The two principles are cumulative, meaning 
16 Rewe (n 3), para 5. 
17 ibid. 
18 Case C-45/76 Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 02043. 
19 Case C-268/06 Impact v Minister for Agriculture and Food, Minister for Arts, Sport and 
Tourism, Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Minister for Transport 
[2008] ECR I-2483 and Joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08 Rosalba Alassini v Telecom 
Italia SpA (C-317/08), Filomena Califano v Wind SpA (C-318/08), Lucia Anna Giorgia 
Iacono v Telecom Italia SpA (C-319/08) and Multiservice Srl v Telecom Italia SpA (C-
320/08) [2010] ECR I-2213. 
20 Rewe (n 3), para 5. 
21 Case C-199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v SpA San Giorgio [1983] 
ECR 03595, para 14. 
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that they must both be fulfilled in order for a national procedural system to 
comply with EU law.22 
This system, in which the Member States are responsible for upholding EU 
law under their national procedural laws, has been described as one of 
national procedural autonomy that is limited only by the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness.23 
In the case law of the CJEU individuals looking to benefit from rights under 
EU law have often relied upon the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness to secure their rights.24 However, the primary purpose of the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness has never been to safeguard the 
right of individuals, but to ensure the effective application of EU law.25 The 
rationale for this has been the view that the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness are part of a larger legal system assuring the effectiveness of 
EU law.26 
Nial Fennelly identifies this system as comprised of the principles of Direct 
Effect, Supremacy (or Primacy), conform interpretation of national law (or 
Indirect Effect), the Duty to apply EU law ex officio, Effective Judicial 
Protection for EU rights, State Liability and the Preliminary Ruling 
Procedure. Together they ensure the effective and uniform application of 
EU law throughout the Union.27 
Parallel to developing the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, the 
ECJ also developed case law concerning similar situations, but where the 
court instead relied upon the principle of ‘effective judicial protection’28. A 
principle having as its purpose to protect individual rights,29 and therefore 
differs from the principles of equivalence and effectiveness which, as 
mentioned, serve a different purpose. 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty in 2009, individuals have 
been given an explicit right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial in 
Article 47 of the Charter, which is a codification of already existing rights, 
stemming from case law of the CJEU. 30 
22 ibid, para 17. 
23 Craig (n 4). 
24 All of the cases described in chapter two concerned individuals seeking to rely on EU 
rights, but being prevented from doing so due to national rules, subsequently evaluated 
against the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 
25 Simmenthal (n 14). 
26 Nial Fennelly, ‘The National Judge as a Judge of the European Union’ in Allan Rosas, 
Egils Levits and Yves Bot (eds) The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: 
Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2013) 69. 
27 ibid, 63–64. 
28 See chapter three. 
29 Johnston (n 15), para 20. 
30 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, given 
interpretative value according to Article 52(7) of the Charter. The explanations also clarify 
that Article 47 is a right corresponding to Article 6(1) ECHR. 
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Through Article 6(3) TEU, individuals are also protected by the ECHR, as 
well as by constitutional principles common to the Member States, as 
General Principles of EU law.31  
There are other statutes entailing similar protection, which are yet to be 
developed in the case law of the CJEU. Article 19(1) TEU states that 
Member States have an obligation of ensuring ‘effective legal protection’, 
the meaning of which is still unclear. Furthermore, Article 41 of the Charter 
gives individuals a right to good administration that has recently been the 
focus of the ECJ, which has found it to be of general application.32 
1.2 Problems and research questions 
As described, determining the substantive content of effective judicial 
protection in EU law is difficult. Some scholars rely on Article 47 of the 
Charter and case law of the ECJ to conclude that the principle of effective 
judicial protection is a more general principle, whilst the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness are additional ‘overarching principles’. 33 
Others seem to avoid the concept altogether and instead address the 
principles separately.34 The case law of the ECJ provides little guidance, 
since the CJEU varies in its use of the principles, leading to case law where 
seemingly similar situations are met with different reasoning by the courts. 
The first question of this thesis is therefore what the principle of effective 
judicial protection entails. 
In order to answer this question it must be divided into two sub-questions, 
firstly 
1) 
a) Is there any difference between the principle of effective judicial 
protection on the one hand and the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness on the other? 
In relation to the first sub-question it is also of interest to examine the role 
played by the different codifications said to encompass parts, or the whole 
of, the principle of effective judicial protection. Does the court utilise 
Articles 47 and 41 of the Charter, Articles 6(1) and 13 ECHR or Article 
19(1) TEU? If so, how do they relate to the principles developed in case 
law? The second sub-question is therefore, 
31 Article 52(3) and (4) of the Charter. 
32 See section 4.3.6. 
33 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Effective Judicial Protection in the EU’ (Assises de la justice 
conference, Brussels, November 2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-
2013/files/interventions/koenlenarts.pdf> accessed 23 May 2014, 1 and similarly, Johanna 
Engström, The Europeanisation of Remedies and Procedures through Judge-made Law: 
Can a Trojan Horse achieve Effectiveness? (European University Institute 2009) 50–54 
who describes the principles of equivalence and effectiveness as overarching. 
34 See Fennelly (n 26), who addresses the principles of equivalence and effectiveness under 
the headline ‘National Procedural Autonomy’, and subsequently addresses the principle of 
effective judicial protection under its own headline. 
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b) How do the codifications of the principle of effective judicial 
protection relate to the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and 
effective judicial protection? 
After clarifying the structure and content of the principle of effective 
judicial protection, in case law as well as in codifications, it is relevant to 
make a normative evaluation of how the ECJ applies the principle. Since 
there is confusion as to which legal sources the national procedural 
legislation is to be compared with, questions arise as to which underlying 
purposes there are and whether they are being adequately protected by the 
ECJ. In order to answer these, the second question is, 
2) 
a) Which is/are the purpose(s) underlying the principle of effective 
judicial protection? 
b) Is the ECJ adequately protecting this/these purpose(s) in its case 
law? 
The purpose of this thesis is thus twofold. First, it is a descriptive thesis that 
seeks to establish what the law is. The last sub-question is however of a 
different nature, since it seeks to establish the adequacy of the protection 
offered by the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and effective judicial 
protection. In that sense, this thesis seeks to establish what the law ought to 
be. The answer to that question will therefore consist of normative values. 
1.3 Structure and methodology 
This thesis is thematically structured. It describes the different principles 
and codifications in separate chapters. The chapters are arranged in 
chronological order, starting with the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness, which were developed first, and ending with the codifications 
that entered into force with the Lisbon treaty. The content of each chapter is 
also arranged chronologically, describing the developments in the order in 
which they occurred. 
The second chapter will describe the evolvement of the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness. It divides their evolution into three waves of 
case law. The third chapter will describe and examine case law that the ECJ 
frames as concerning the principle of effective judicial protection. In 
doctrine, a differentiation between the cases described in chapter two and 
three is usually not done. Instead, they are treated as different aspects of the 
same area of law.35 The rationale behind the categorisation made in this 
35 See for instance Engström (n 33), Angela Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of 
Private Parties in EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2007) and Michael Dougan, National Remedies 
Before the Court of Justice (Hart Publishing 2004). In contrast a separation is made by 
other scholars, see for instance Sacha Prechal and Rob Widdershoven, ‘Redefining the 
Relationship between “Rewe-effectiveness” and Effective Judicial Protection’ (2011) 4 
Review of European Administrative Law 31 and Fennelly (n 26). As previously described 
the latter addresses the principles of equivalence and effectiveness under the headline 
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thesis is the ambition to examine each possible part of effective judicial 
protection by its own merits, in order to get a clearer image of the principle 
altogether. A fitting analogy is that of disassembling a LEGO-figure in 
order to examine each piece of LEGO separately. 
The fourth chapter describes different legal statutes that are said to entail the 
principle of effective judicial protection, or at least parts of it. 
The fifth chapter takes a slightly different approach than the preceding 
chapters, as it seeks to describe how the ECJ has approached the issue of 
effective judicial protection once it got access to the legal statutes described 
in chapter four. It therefore describes cases that either refer explicitly to one 
of those statutes, or arose after the 1 December 2009, when the Lisbon 
treaty entered into force. To return to the LEGO analogy, this chapter 
describes the figure of effective judicial protection as a whole, the purpose 
being to investigate how the previously examined LEGO-pieces are being 
fitted together by the ECJ. 
The sixth chapter provides some concluding remarks on the findings in the 
previous chapters, as well as the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
conducted analysis. 
This thesis will use a legalistic method in order to explore what the law is. 
The method consists of several steps, beginning with a textual analysis of 
the relevant provisions. Thereafter a conceptual analysis will follow, 
examining not just the wording of the relevant provision, but also their 
factual context and relation to other similar provisions. The third step, as 
noted above, is to examine the actual application of the relevant provisions. 
In order to examine the law as it is this thesis will examine how it is applied. 
This is important, if for no other reason, in order to identify potential 
discrepancies between the text of the provisions and their actual application. 
Hence, the emphasis of the method used in this thesis is not on doctrinal 
interpretations, but on the case law of the ECJ. 
1.4 Terminology 
Throughout this thesis, ‘the principle of effective judicial protection’ is used 
as the term, or concept, being investigated. It has its roots in the ECJ’s 
adoption of the concept in the case law described in chapter three, but it is 
not equated to it per se. The reason for this is to avoid an assumption that 
the principle has remained the same throughout the evolvement of EU law. 
In an attempt to clarify this, chapter three has been named ‘case law labelled 
effective judicial protection’. 
Some scholars refer to the ‘principles of effective judicial protection’ in 
plural.36 The reason is most likely that they want to use a bundling term, for 
‘National Procedural Autonomy’, and addresses the principle of effective judicial 
protection under its own headline. 
36 See, for instance, Xavier Groussot and Henrik Wenander, ‘Self-standing Actions for 
Judicial Review and the Swedish Factortame’ (2007) 26 Civil Justice Quarterly 376, 383. 
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the principles of equivalence and effectiveness and the principle of effective 
judicial protection. This is likely to have its root in an understanding of the 
principles as governing the same matter, or at least being closely connected. 
That assumption is not made in this thesis, and consequently the principle of 
effective judicial protection is referred to in singular, as does the ECJ.37 
In the description of case law the term ‘the national court’ is used to 
describe all instances of national courts. There is no reason to stay focused 
on the national judicial procedure prior to a question being referred to the 
ECJ, if not relevant for the court’s assessment. In a few cases, an exception 
has been made in order to vary the language, and thus facilitate for the 
reader. These have been clearly marked. 
1.5 Delimitations 
The purpose of this thesis is not to give a full and exhaustive statement of all 
aspects of effective judicial protection. Some delimitations are therefore 
necessary, but also helpful in defining the core of the issues examined. 
This thesis seeks to evaluate the principle of effective judicial protection in 
relation to procedures before national courts. No cases regarding the 
principle of effective judicial protection in relation to proceedings against 
the institutions of the EU will therefore be addressed. 
The case law examined in this thesis does not include competition law 
cases. The principle of effective judicial protection does apply in the field of 
competition law, 38  but it is not without risk to draw analogies from 
competition law and apply them to other fields of EU law. This is so 
because of the different and more particular features of competition law 
cases. They are often focused on economic factors, which may explain 
diversions from principles as developed in other fields of EU law. 
The EU has concluded several international agreements containing 
provisions on effective judicial protection. One example is the UN 
Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities39, to which the EU is a 
signatory. Since the EU is bound by the convention, it forms an integral part 
of EU law, as confirmed by the ECJ. 40  Even so, such international 
agreements often constitute their own legal regimes, and will therefore not 
be addressed. 
37 See, for instance, Case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v 
Justitiekanslern [2007] ECR I-2271. 
38 Regarding the principles recent development in the field of competition law, see Eleanor 
Sharpston, ‘Effective Judicial Protection through Adequate Judicial Scrutiny – some 
reflections’ (2013) 4 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 453. 
39 The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
<http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml> accessed 22 May 2014. 
40 Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v 
Dansk almennyttigt Boligselskab (C-335/11) v HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone 
Skouboe Werge v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S, in 
liquidation (C-337/11) [2013] OJ C156/6, paras 28–30. 
 8 
                                                 
A similar situation is that when the EU is not just a signatory to an 
international agreement, but also has adopted secondary legislation to enact 
it. In the context of effective judicial protection, the Aarhus convention41 is 
an example of that. In addition to being a party to it, the EU has adopted two 
directives 42 , making its provisions binding on the Member States. 
Furthermore, the EU has adopted a Regulation 43 making the convention 
binding also on its own institutions. Since the international agreements upon 
which such secondary legislation is based will not be addressed, neither will 
the Directives and Regulations enacting them. 
One important exception to the above stated is made in relation to the 
ECHR, which is intimately connected to EU law, as will be described in 
chapter four. 
In relation to the material used for analysis it is important to note that not all 
case law on national procedural autonomy and effective judicial protection 
will be analysed. The cases selected for analysis will be the cases that first 
establish a relevant principle, or establish a development of such a principle. 
As far as possible, the selected cases are cases that are considered to be of 
importance in the legal doctrine, either for developing effective judicial 
protection in itself (including expanding or defining its areas of 
applicability), or for confirming that certain aspects of it is still valid law. In 
order to ascertain the highest possible consistency and credibility, the case 
law examined is limited to judgments from the ECJ, meaning that cases 
from the General Court and cases resulting not in judgments, but in orders 
will not be addressed. 
In regard of the last sub-question it is important to note that the analysis of 
whether or not effective judicial protection fulfils its purpose does not 
include a carte blanche approach, drafting a new concept of the law as it 
ought to be without relation to its current surrounding context. On the 
contrary, the analysis will take its starting point in the different sources 
establishing the principle of effective judicial protection and from there 
analyse whether or not there are holes in the logic of the ECJ. In other 
words, the thesis will lay the puzzle and see if there are any pieces missing; 
it will not evaluate the beauty of the puzzle itself. 
41 The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf> accessed 22 May 
2014. 
42 Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 
on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC 
[2003] OJ L41/26 and Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 May 2003 providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain 
plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public 
participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC [2003] OJ 
L156/17. 
43 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access 
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies [2006] OJ L264/13. 
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Analysing official documents of the EU is always connected with linguistic 
problems. It has not been possible to conduct a comparative study between 
different translations of the documents used in this thesis, they have 
therefore been read, and analysed, solely in English. 
Lastly, it should be mentioned that given the purpose of this thesis there is 
no need to describe in detail the outcome of each particular case. It is the 
ECJ’s reasoning in regard of the principles and provisions themselves, and 
how they are utilised, that is of interest to the analysis – not whether or not a 
particular feature of national legislation was held to be in compliance with 
EU law or not. Several scholars take a different approach, defining the 
principle of effective judicial protection by the material outcome in regard 
of, for example, time limits for bringing an action before courts.44 This will 
not be done in this thesis. 
44 See for instance Angela Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EU 
Law (2nd edn, OUP 2007) ch 4. 
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2 The Principles of Equivalence 
and Effectiveness 
The principles of effectiveness and equivalence were developed solely in the 
case law of the CJEU. Therefore, the best way to explain and examine these 
principles is to follow their evolvement through the case law of the ECJ, 
starting with the initial cautious evaluation of national procedural 
autonomy,45 following it through the ebbs and flows of varying activism 
ending up with the adoption of the approach used by the court in more 
recent cases.46 
2.1 The First Wave of Case Law 
In this first wave of case law, the principles of equivalence and effectiveness 
originated based on a cooperative and respectful reasoning by the ECJ, 
highlighting the role of national procedural autonomy. The principle of 
sincere cooperation47 was used as the basis for intervention in the Member 
States national procedural laws, and the emphasis was not put on the 
supremacy of EU law, but on the cooperation between national courts and 
the CJEU. The principles were established in the cases of Rewe 48  and 
Comet49 as early as in the 1970s. 
Rewe concerned the import of French apples by two German companies that 
had paid a ‘phyto-sanitary inspection’ charge mandatory under national 
legislation. It was not disputed that such charges were contrary to EU law, 
but the national procedural rules at the time prescribed a time limit within 
which unlawfully paid charges could be challenged. That period had passed 
before the action was brought to the national court, and thus the question of 
whether or not such time limitations were in conformity with EU law arose. 
The ECJ relied on the principle of sincere cooperation in finding that 
national courts were entrusted with ensuring the legal protection that Union 
citizens derive from the direct effect of EU law. It then emphasised that it is, 
in the absence of EU harmonisation, 
for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate 
the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural 
conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the 
protection of the rights which citizens have from the direct 
effect of Community law, it being understood that such 
45 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP 2012) 704. 
46 ibid 715. 
47 Now given expression in Article 4(3) TEU. 
48 Case C-33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für 
das Saarland [1976] ECR 01989. 
49 Case C-45/76 Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 02043. 
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conditions cannot be less favourable than those relating to 
similar actions of a domestic nature.50 
Thereby, the ECJ established the principle of equivalence as a limit to 
national procedural autonomy. The court then repeated itself by pointing out 
the specific treaty provisions that enabled harmonisation measures to be 
taken if national rules restrained the functioning of the internal market,51 
followed by the conclusion that in the absence of such harmonisation the 
national procedural rules are to apply. The court thus based its scrutiny of 
national procedural rules on the functioning of the internal market, or, in 
other words, the effectiveness of EU law. 
The court continued its reasoning by stating that national procedural rules 
could not make it ‘impossible in practice to exercise the rights which the 
national courts are obliged to protect.’52 That phrasing constitutes the roots 
of the principles of effectiveness.53 
The Comet-case, delivered on the same day as Rewe concerns similar 
charges, the difference being that they were placed on the exporter instead 
of the importer. The reasoning, and even the wording, that described the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness were identical to that in Rewe.54  
The first cases establishing the principles of equivalence and effectiveness 
were thus quite clear in stating that the legal foundation of the principles is 
the principle of sincere cooperation, and that the responsibility for 
enforcement of EU law is, as a corollary, clearly put on the Member States. 
In finding so, the court showed respect for the national procedural systems 
of the Member States, acknowledging that the national courts were also 
acting as EU courts, enforcing EU law within their jurisdiction. 
In the subsequent case, Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord55, the court clarified 
that there is no obligation on the Member States to introduce new remedies 
in their national procedural systems. The case concerned so-called butter-
buying cruises that were organised in Germany. At the time shipping 
companies organised short cruises that entered territorial waters or the high 
seas outside of German territory, and therefore also outside of the territory 
of the EU. As a result of this butter and other goods could be bought by the 
passengers without the imposition of taxes. In fact, since the ships left the 
50 Rewe (n 48), para 5 at 1997. 
51 At the time the ’Common Market’. 
52 Rewe (n 48), para 5 at 1998. 
53 It is sometimes described as the ’principle of practical impossibility’, presumably to 
differentiate it from later developments of the principle of effectiveness, see for instance 
Paul Craig (n 45) 704. However, Rewe is generally accepted as establishing principle of 
effectiveness, see for instance Sacha Prechal and Rob Widdershoven, ‘Redefining the 
Relationship between “Rewe-effectiveness” and Effective Judicial Protection’ (2011) 4 
Review of European Administrative Law 31 and the ECJ’s judgment in case C-279/09 DEB 
[2010] ECR I-13849, para 28, where the court refers to the findings in Rewe as ‘well-
established case-law on the principle of effectiveness’. 
54 Comet (n 49), paras 11–16 in comparison with Rewe (n 48), para 5. 
55 Case C-158/80 Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH et Rewe-Markt Steffen v 
Hauptzollamt Kiel [1981] ECR 1805. 
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territory of the EU, all agricultural products (such as butter) were subsidised 
by the Union. This upset German wholesalers and retailers, who brought 
charges against these cruises before national court. In those proceedings the 
question arose of whether a trader had the right to ask a national court to 
require other traders to comply with Union law. The question was referred 
to the ECJ, which answered in the negative, declaring that the treaties are 
‘not intended to create new remedies in the national courts’.56 
The original jurisprudence is in that sense respectful towards the Member 
States, and their organisation of judicial procedures. The picture that was 
painted was indeed a picture with the emphasis on Member State authority. 
Had the Member States not agreed upon harmonisation of procedures 
through EU-legislation, then EU law would only in exceptional cases affect 
national procedural rules. The rhetoric used by the ECJ suggested that the 
meaning of the principle of sincere cooperation was that the EU should be 
respectful towards the national procedural orders of its Member States, since 
the task of applying EU law belonged to the national courts and not the EU. 
The clear picture that has emerged thus far was, however, nuanced some 
years later through cases such as San Giorgio57, von Colson58 and Dorit 
Harz59. The two latter cases will be addressed in chapter three. 
San Giorgio concerned a national rule on the burden of evidence. SpA San 
Giorgio was an Italian dairy producer subject to unlawful charges on health 
inspections. Again, it was not disputed that the charges were unlawful, but 
the Italian government claimed that the costs had been passed on to the 
customers of SpA San Giorgio, and that reimbursement would therefore 
amount to unjust enrichment. 
The court used the same test as in Comet and Rewe, stating first that the 
entitlement to repayment is a right conferred on individuals by EU law. 
Secondly, it stated that the repayment could be sought only within the 
framework laid down by national law, and thirdly it stated that those 
provisions could not be less favourable than those relating to similar 
national charges.60 
Next, the court addressed the principle of effectiveness, and widened its 
scope of application. The court held that ‘any requirement of proof which 
has the effect of making it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to 
secure repayment of charges levied contrary to Community law would be 
incompatible with Community law’61 The impossibility criteria from Rewe 
was thereby amended with a criteria of excessive difficulty, 
Towards the end of the judgment, the ECJ also clarified that the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness are cumulative. It stated that if national 
56 ibid, para 44. 
57 Case C-199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v SpA San Giorgio [1983] 
ECR 03595. 
58 Case C-14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 
[1984] ECR 01891. 
59 Case C-79/83 Dorit Harz v Deutsche Tradax GmbH [1984] ECR 01921. 
60 San Giorgio (n 57), para 12. 
61 ibid, para 14 (emphasis added). 
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rules rendered it virtually impossible to secure repayment of charges they 
were incompatible with EU law, even if the same virtual impossibility 
extended to all national measures as well.62 
San Giorgio thus marked a development of the principle of effectiveness, 
easing the requirement of virtual impossibility by including also situations 
where it was not impossible, but merely excessively difficult, to secure a 
right conferred by EU law. Another novelty in San Giorgio is the statement 
that in principle, there is a right to be reimbursed for unlawfully levied 
charges,63 even if the national legislation does not provide for it. The ECJ 
thus found that there are situations where new remedies may have to be 
adopted, putting a limitation to the no new remedies-rule adopted in 
Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord64. 
2.2 The Second Wave of Case Law 
Some years after the initial cases were delivered a second wave of cases 
relating to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness arose. This second 
wave is characterised by a different approach by the CJEU, focusing on the 
obligation of Member States to ascertain the effective application of EU law, 
based on the principle of supremacy.65 The previously respectful attitude 
towards the national procedural autonomy of the Member States was then 
replaced by a rhetoric focused on the effective application of EU law, 
indicating that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness mark a 
self-preserving policy. 
The first case to mark this change of attitude is Simmenthal66. It concerned 
charges for public health inspections of beef intended for human 
consumption. The charges had been declared unlawful in previous 
proceedings, but the national courts were not empowered to set aside 
conflicting national legislation until the authorities especially entrusted with 
this power had done so. The ECJ was asked by the national court whether 
this was an obstacle to the full, complete and uniform effect of EU law. The 
ECJ began by stating that the very meaning of direct applicability was that 
EU law must be fully and uniformly applied in all Member States from the 
date of entry into force.67 It then stated that by entering into force these rules 
automatically declared incompatible existing national legislation 
inapplicable, and precluded the valid adoption of new conflicting laws.68 
Against this background, the court held that it would be an impairment of 
62 ibid, para 17. 
63 ibid, para 12. 
64 Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord (n 55). 
65 Regarding the principle of supremacy and its legal context, see Sacha Prechal, ‘Direct 
Effect, Indirect Effect, Supremacy and the Evolving Constitution of the European Union’ in 
Catherine Barnard (ed) The Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited: Assessing the Impact of 
the Constitutional Debate (OUP 2007). 
66 Case C-106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] 
ECR 00629. 
67 ibid, para 14. 
68 ibid, para 17. 
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the effectiveness of EU law if national courts were prevented from applying 
it in accordance with a judgment from the CJEU. Therefore, an obligation 
on national courts to set aside any conflicting national rule existed.69 The 
court stated that: 
Accordingly any provision of a national legal system and any 
legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might 
impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from 
the national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the 
power to do everything necessary at the moment of its 
application to set aside national legislative provisions which 
might prevent Community rules from having full force and 
effect are incompatible with those requirements which are the 
very essence of Community law.70 
The reasoning in Simmenthal thus quite clearly differs from the previous 
reasoning, where the court emphasised that it is for national courts to uphold 
EU law in accordance with their respective national procedural systems. 
Instead, the reasoning in Simmenthal takes as its starting point the full and 
uniform application of EU law. Instead of turning to the principle of sincere 
cooperation, the court turned to the principle of supremacy as the basis for 
the obligation of national courts to disapply conflicting national procedural 
rules. The outcome of the cases in the first and second waves of case law is 
thus similar, but the reasoning differs substantially. In Simmenthal there is 
not even a mentioning of the principle of sincere cooperation, which formed 
a central part of the court’s reasoning in the first wave of case law. 
The emphasis on effectiveness of EU law is relevant also when examining 
the rule that the treaties are not intended to introduce new remedies into the 
national legislation of EU Member States. The conclusion in Simmenthal 
that Member States have to do ‘everything necessary’ to set aside 
conflicting national legislation implies an obligation to introduce new 
remedies. The court would clarify its reasoning in Factortame I71. 
The Factortame I case was the first in a series of cases before the ECJ 
reaching from 1989 to 1996, when the third and final judgment was 
delivered by the ECJ.72 The cases have had a great impact on several areas 
of law and have been addressed extensively in doctrine. 73  The factual 
69 ibid, paras 20–21. 
70 ibid, para 22. 
71 Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd 
and others [1990] ECR I-02433. 
72 The other cases from the CJEU are case C-221/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others [1991] ECR I-3905 (Factortame II); and 
joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Federal Republic of Germany 
and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others 
[1996] ECR I-01029 (Factortame III). In addition, the affair gave rise to two additional 
proceedings in national courts, see David Vaughan ‘Factortame and After: A Fishy Story’ 
(2005) 16 European Business Law Review 511. 
73 See for instance A. E. Munir, Fisheries after Factortame (Butterworths 1991), describing 
a whole new fisheries market in the United Kingdom and Vaughan, ibid, which gives a 
concise review of the sequence of events. 
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background in Factortame I was the national regulation of fishing outside 
the coast of the United Kingdom. At the time of Factortame I the UK had 
recently changed its laws on registration of fishing vessels in order to ‘put a 
stop to the practice known as “quota shopping” whereby, according to the 
United Kingdom, its fishing quotas are “plundered” by vessels flying the 
British flag but lacking any genuine link with the United Kingdom’.74 
Under the new legislation a vessel could be registered only if it could be 
proven that ownership of the vessel was British; that it was managed in, and 
its operations directed and controlled from the UK; and that all charterers, 
managers or operators of it were qualified persons or companies. The effect 
of the newly adopted legislation was to exclude vessels that were registered 
in the United Kingdom, but operated and/or owned by persons or companies 
in other countries. This included 95 vessels owned by the Spanish 
companies in question. In response, they contested the legislation’s 
compatibility with EU law before national courts – that decided to halt the 
proceedings to refer questions to the ECJ. Before the ECJ could decide on 
the substantive features of the national law, the Commission, joined by the 
applicants, asked for interim relief until a final ruling had been delivered.75 
The House of Lords, however, ruled that national courts could not grant 
interim relief against the crown, meaning the government, under an old 
common law rule in conjunction with a presumption that Acts of Parliament 
are in conformity with superior norms, including EU law, until a decision on 
the matter has been given. This led to the question of whether EU law 
imposed an obligation on national procedural systems to include interim 
relief as a remedy. 
The ECJ initially cited Simmenthal in stating that directly applicable EU 
rules must be fully and uniformly applied in all the Member States, and that 
any legislative, administrative or judicial practice that prevents national 
courts from having jurisdiction to apply provisions of EU law is 
incompatible with EU law.76 On that basis the court, in relation to the case 
at hand, reached its conclusion in finding that 
the full effectiveness of Community law would be just as much 
impaired if a rule of national law could prevent a court seised of 
a dispute governed by Community law from granting interim 
relief in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to 
be given on the existence of the rights claimed under 
Community law. It follows that a court which in those 
circumstances would grant interim relief, if it were not for a rule 
of national law, is obliged to set aside that rule.77 
To be mentioned is the fact that the court this time made an explicit 
reference to the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU, to 
draw the conclusion that national courts must ensure ‘the legal protection 
74 Factortame I (n 71), para 4. 
75 ibid, paras 8 and 10 respectively. 
76 ibid, paras 18 and 20. 
77 ibid, para 21. 
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which persons derive from the direct effect of provisions of Community 
law’.78 The rhetoric of Simmenthal is thus applied, albeit with an added 
reference to the principle of sincere cooperation used in Rewe. However, in 
the first wave of cases, the principle of sincere cooperation was used to 
emphasise the national procedural autonomy of Member States. Its 
application in Factortame I differs in the sense that the rhetoric of the court 
is instead emphasising the obligation of Member States to secure the 
application of EU law to begin with. 
It is worth noting that the situation in the United Kingdom was not one of a 
legal vacuum in regard of interim relief; the concept existed and was 
applied. The problem was thus not that the remedy did not exist, but rather 
that there existed another national rule prohibiting it to be applied against 
the crown. That rule was declared incompatible with EU law, and thus it 
would be wrong to state that Factortame I concerned the introduction of a 
new remedy. On the contrary, it is not possible to deduce from the reasoning 
of the court how it would address a situation where no institute of interim 
relief existed in the first place. 
The next case to be addressed is Dekker79, concerning the Equal Treatment 
Directive80. The national laws prescribed that damages for a breach of the 
directive could only be found if it was proven that the employer was at fault 
and had no grounds for exempting him- or herself from responsibility.81 The 
court initially concluded that the directive did not require any specific form 
of sanction, but that it did require the chosen sanction to guarantee real and 
effective protection, a requirement established in Von Colson, addressed in 
section 3.2 below. It then added an additional criterion, by stating that a 
chosen sanction must ‘have a real deterrent effect’82 on the employer. In 
applying the test to the case, the court found that if liability were made 
subject to a rule of evidence such as that at hand, the practical effect of the 
principle of equal treatment would be considerably weakened. As a 
conclusion, the court found that any breach of the principle of non-
discrimination had to, in itself, be sufficient to make the employer liable – 
without the possibility of exempting him- or herself on the basis of national 
law.83 
Four months later, the ECJ delivered its judgment in Cotter and 
McDermott84. There, the court held that Member States could not rely on 
‘their own unlawful conduct’ 85  by referring to the principle of unjust 
78 ibid, para 19. 
79 Case C-177/88 Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor 
Jong Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus [1990] ECR I-03941. 
80 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle 
of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L 39/40. 
81 Dekker (n 79), para 19. 
82 ibid, para 23. 
83 ibid, para 25. 
84 Case C-377/89 Ann Cotter and Norah McDermott v Minister for Social Welfare and 
Attorney General [1991] ECR I-01155. 
85 ibid, para 26. 
 17 
                                                 
enrichment86 in refusing to pay equal family benefits to men and women. 
The court simply held that the non-discrimination article in the directive at 
hand precluded national legislation providing different benefits for men and 
women, because women ‘in the same family circumstances are entitled to 
the same payments even if that infringes the prohibition on unjust 
enrichment laid down by national law’. 87  No further elaboration was 
provided by the ECJ, causing the High Court of Ireland to halt proceedings 
in the similar case of Emmott 88, and refer questions on the meaning of 
Cotter and McDermott to the ECJ. This time, the ECJ developed its 
reasoning more clearly. 
Mrs Emmott was a married woman with two dependent children receiving a 
disability benefit at a reduced rate applicable to all married women. The 
Irish government later adjusted that rate, so that she received the same rate 
as unmarried men and women – but without a certain amendment for 
dependent children. Finally, she was granted the full rate, but the decision 
only provided for retroactive effect in respect of some of the time that she 
had received the lower rates. 
In her correspondence with the Irish authorities, Mrs Emmott was told that 
she could not bring action before the national courts because of the pending 
litigation in Cotter and McDermott. As soon as she could Mrs Emmott did 
bring an action before national courts, but the Irish government then relied 
upon a national rule stating that an application for judicial review of these 
matters had to be brought within three months – a time limit which Mrs 
Emmott had exceeded by then. 
In its assessment the court went back to basics in referring to the formula of 
equivalence and virtual impossibility from Rewe and San Giorgio.89 It then 
added that ‘[w]hilst the laying down of reasonable time-limits which, if 
unobserved, bar proceedings, in principle satisfies the two conditions 
mentioned above, account must nevertheless be taken of the particular 
nature of directives’.90 By reference to von Colson the court held that even 
though the treaties leave Member States free to themselves define the means 
by which they implement directives into national law, it does not relieve 
them from their duty ‘to adopt, within the framework of their national legal 
systems, all the measures necessary to ensure that the directive is fully 
effective, in accordance with the objective which it pursues’.91 
The effects of not implementing a directive correctly within the prescribed 
time limit played a crucial role in the court’s conclusion. It held that since 
the provisions of a directive only in specific circumstances could be given 
direct effect it was a minimum guarantee, leaving individuals unable to 
ascertain all of their rights until the date of proper implementation. As a 
86 See San Giorgio (n 57). 
87 Cotter and McDermott (n 84), para 27. 
88 Case C-208/90 Theresa Emmott v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney General 
[1991] ECR I-04269. 
89 ibid, para 16. 
90 ibid, para 17. 
91 ibid, para 18. 
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conclusion, the court held that Member States could not rely upon time 
limits in national legislation until the time of correct implementation, which 
was the earliest point of which such time limits could begin to tick. 
This second wave of case law provides for a strengthening of EU law in 
relation to national procedural autonomy. In Simmenthal the ECJ 
completely left the rhetoric of the principle of sincere cooperation that 
implies a mutual respect92, and instead focused on the one-sided rhetoric of 
supremacy to ensure the effectiveness of EU law. 
The development of EU law can be described as ebbs and flows – with new 
evolutions (flows) often being limited by subsequent cases (ebbs). Such an 
ebb to this series of cases strengthening the position of EU law can be found 
in Steenhorst-Neerings93. 
The applicant in the case, Mrs Steenhorst-Neerings, sought to be granted a 
benefit for incapacity for work that previously had been reserved for men 
and unmarried women. National courts had already declared the legislation 
invalid, but the extent of retroactive payment to be awarded Mrs Steenhorst-
Neerings was still disputed.94 In the proceedings the Commission, relying 
on Emmott, considered a national law prescribing time limits on the amount 
of retroactive payment to be applicable only after the Member State had 
correctly implemented the underlying Directive.95 
The court’s reply was clear. It addressed the Commission’s argumentation 
in just one paragraph by stating: ‘That argument cannot be upheld’.96 It then 
stated that the facts of Emmott were clearly distinguishable from the case at 
hand in that the purposes behind the two time limits were different. The aim 
of the rule limiting the retroactive payment of incapacity benefits was, 
according to the national legislation, to ‘ensure sound administration, most 
importantly so that it may be ascertained whether the claimant satisfied the 
conditions for eligibility and so that the degree of incapacity, which may 
very well vary over time, may be fixed’, as well as reflecting the need to 
preserve a financial balance.97 
The case of Steenhorst-Neerings is considered to be not just a limitation of 
Emmott, but also the marking of a more general limitation of the EU courts’ 
more intrusive approach towards national procedural autonomy. 98  Later 
cases such as Johnson II99 in which the court held that ‘it is clear from the 
judgment in Steenhorst-Neerings that the solution adopted in Emmott was 
justified by the particular circumstances of that case’ 100  confirms this 
92 Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 421, 429. 
93 Case C-338/91 H. Steenhorst-Neerings v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor 
Detailhandel, Ambachten en Huisvrouwen [1993] ECR I-05475. 
94 ibid, paras 5 and 13 respectively. 
95 ibid, para 17. 
96 ibid, para 18. 
97 ibid, para 23. 
98 Tridimas (n 92). 
99 Case C-410/92 Elsie Rita Johnson v Chief Adjudication Officer [1994] ECR I-05483. 
100 ibid, para 26. 
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interpretation. Similarly, the case of Sutton 101  limited Marshall II 102  by 
differentiating the awarding of reparation for loss and damages from social 
security benefits. There, the court held that the importance of receiving 
interest for the passing of time set forth in Marshall II does not apply to the 
latter.103 
2.3 The Third Wave of Case Law 
In the third wave of case law, the ECJ takes a more balanced approach to the 
previous clashes between national procedural autonomy on the one hand and 
the effectiveness of EU law on the other. It finds that each case must be 
evaluated on its own merits, taking into account the role of the disputed 
provision in the procedural system as a whole. This changed approach by 
the ECJ has been compared to the model of objective justification used by 
the court in cases concerning free movement.104 
The third wave was adopted in Peterbroeck 105  and van Schijndel 106 
delivered on the same day. Here, the court developed the criteria to be used 
by national courts in deciding upon whether or not national legislation was 
in breach of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The court 
introduced a balancing of the two principles ‘by reference to the role of that 
provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a 
whole, before the various national instances’.107 
Peterbroeck concerned a dispute over taxes in which the applicant had 
waited to submit the argument that the national tax legislation was in breach 
of EU law until the proceedings reached a Belgian Cour d’Appel after being 
evaluated by an administrative body. The Belgian state responded with the 
argument that new pleas could not be made at that point. The question arose 
of whether there was an obligation on national courts to raise points of EU 
law by their own notion, even though the time limit prescribed had passed. 
It was referred to the ECJ, which began by stating that it had repeatedly held 
that it was for the Member States to ensure the legal protection that 
individuals derive from the direct effect of EU law, and that the basis of this 
is the principle of sincere cooperation. It then repeated the classic formula 
101 Case C-66/95 The Queen v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Eunice Sutton 
[1997] ECR I-02163. 
102 Case C-271/91 M. Helen Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area 
Health Authority [1993] ECR I-04367. 
103 ibid, paras 24 and 27. 
104 Michael Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice (Hart Publishing 
2004) 30 and Gráinne De Búrca, ‘National Procedural Rules and Remedies: the Changing 
Approach of the Court of Justice’ in Lonbay J and Biondi A (eds) Remedies for Breach of 
EC Law (John Wiley & Sons 1997) ch 4. For a description of that model see Catherine 
Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (4th edn, OUP 2013) ch 6. 
105 Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v Belgian State [1995] 
ECR I-04599. 
106 Case C-431/93 Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen v 
Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten [1995] ECR I-04705. 
107 ibid, para 19 and Peterbroeck (n 105), para 14. 
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on the principles of equivalence and effectiveness established in Rewe.108 In 
a subsequent paragraph, it added the guidelines with which the court should 
analyse these principles, by stating that 
[f]or the purposes of applying those principles, each case which 
raises the question whether a national procedural provision 
renders application of Community law impossible or excessively 
difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that 
provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, 
viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In the 
light of that analysis the basic principles of the domestic judicial 
system, such as protection of the rights of the defence, the 
principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of procedure, 
must, where appropriate, be taken into consideration.109 
In applying this new balancing test the court stated that a 60-day time limit 
for bringing pleas was not inconsistent with EU law as such, but that the 
special procedure at hand must be examined. It singled out several relevant 
factors such as; that the Cour d’Appel was the first court that could refer 
questions to the ECJ; that, in this particular case, the time period in which 
new pleas could be brought had passed by the time that the Cour d’Appel 
held its hearing; that no other court or tribunal could raise points of EU law 
in subsequent hearings; and finally, that the impossibility of courts to raise 
points of EU law by its own motion did not appear to be reasonably 
justifiable by other principles, such as legal certainty or the proper conduct 
of procedure.110 
The court came to the conclusion that EU law thus precluded the national 
legislation at hand.111 
Van Schijndel had similar facts. The case concerned a dispute over pensions, 
and the applicants did not put forth their arguments that the national 
legislation was precluded by EU law until the proceedings reached the Hoge 
Raad, the supreme court of the Netherlands. At that point, the applicants 
argued that there existed an obligation for the national court to, if necessary 
by its own motion, address questions of EU law. 
The court addressed the question in the same way as it did in Peterbroeck. 
First it repeated that it is for national courts to lay down the detailed 
procedural rules under which individuals safeguard their EU rights. 
Interestingly enough the court did not mention the principle of sincere 
cooperation, instead it just stated that in the absence of Union measures 
harmonising procedural rules, the domestic legal system is to be applied. It 
then quoted Rewe in repeating the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness and subsequently confirmed the new test mentioned above.112 
108 Peterbroeck (n 105), para 12. 
109 ibid, para 14. 
110 ibid, paras 17–20. 
111 ibid, para 21. 
112 van Schijndel (n 106), paras 17 and 19. 
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In applying the test to the facts of the particular case at hand, it pointed out 
that the national principle that courts must or may raise points of their own 
notion was limited by the duty to keep to the point, and not address facts 
other than those already brought before the courts.113 It then held that such a 
limitation was based on the fact that in civil suits it is for the parties to bring 
pleas, leaving the court passive other than in exceptional cases. The court 
held that 
[t]hat principle reflects conceptions prevailing in most of the 
Member States as to the relations between the State and the 
individual; it safeguards the rights of the defence; and it ensures 
proper conduct of proceedings by, in particular, protecting them 
from the delays inherent in examination of new pleas.114 
It then reached the conclusion that EU law did not preclude the national 
legislation at hand.115 
2.4 The Comparative Neglect of the 
Principle of Equivalence 
In the abovementioned case law, a clear focus has been on the principle of 
effectiveness. In some of the abovementioned cases, the principle of 
equivalence is addressed briefly and in others it is not addressed 
substantially at all. Michael Dougan describes this lack of interest in the 
case law from the CJEU as ‘years of comparative neglect’, that were 
countered in the late 1990s by a growing interest amongst litigants to 
explore the limits of the principle of equivalence in improving protection of 
their rights derived from EU law. 116  Two cases can be relied upon to 
illustrate the ECJ’s response, Palmisani117 and Levez118. 
The former concerned a dispute over loss and damages for an individual 
negatively affected by the belated transposition into national law of a 
directive. There was a national rule stating that such actions had to be 
brought within a year from the date that national legislation implementing 
the directive was adopted. To be mentioned is that under national law, the 
general provisions governing the reparation of non-contractual damages was 
subject to a five-year prescription rule. The question thus was whether the 
two national legislative regimes were comparable. 
The court began its analysis by stating that it is in principle for national 
courts to decide upon the compatibility of national legislation with the 
113 ibid, para 20. 
114 ibid, para 21. 
115 ibid, para 22. 
116 Dougan (n 104), 24. 
117 Case C-261/95 Rosalba Palmisani v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) 
[1997] ECR I-04025. 
118 Case C-326/96 B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd [1998] ECR I-07835. 
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principle of equivalence.119 Nevertheless, it continued by pointing out that 
the procedural regime applicable to claims based on the directive and the 
domestic procedural scheme, both pointed out by the national court, served 
different purposes, and that it therefore was unnecessary to compare 
them.120 
Instead, the court clarified how to address situations where there is no 
similar national claim to compare with. It held that if 
the national court were unable to undertake any other relevant 
comparison between the time-limit at issue and the conditions 
relating to similar claims of a domestic nature, the conclusion 
would have to be drawn, in view of the foregoing, that 
Community law does not preclude a Member State from 
requiring any action for reparation of the loss or damage 
sustained as a result of the belated transposition of the Directive 
to be brought within a limitation period of one year from the 
date of its transposition into national law.121 
If no comparator can be found, the principle of equivalence is thus not 
breached, and the focus must instead be turned to the principle of 
effectiveness. 
The second case, Levez, was initiated by Mrs Levez, a woman who had been 
employed as manager of a betting shop in the United Kingdom. After a 
promotion she replaced a male predecessor who had earned UKL 11 400, 
but her pay was only raised to UKL 10 800. This in spite of the fact that it 
was not disputed that she performed the same job as her predecessor, and 
that all shop managers were subject to the same terms and conditions.122 
She brought an action before the competent Industrial Tribunal, but soon 
received a letter informing her that since there was a time-limit of two years 
for bringing such actions the tribunal could not award the damages she 
sought. Mrs Levez appealed the decision to court, and the proceedings were 
halted as questions on the compatibility of the two-year time limit was sent 
to the ECJ. 
The court’s reply to the questions, in regard of the principle of equivalence, 
is quite extensive compared to earlier cases. The structure is familiar, and 
unsurprisingly begins with a reference to Palmisani, stating that it is in 
principle for national courts to ascertain whether national rules are in 
conformity with the principle of equivalence, with the reservation that the 
ECJ can always provide guidance to the national court in question. The 
court took full use of this possibility, providing a detailed examination of 
the applicable national rules and then reached a clear conclusion, leaving the 
national court no margin of discretion. First, it stated that the principle of 
equivalence is not to be interpreted as meaning that Member States must 
119 Palmisani (n 117), para 33. 
120 ibid, para 36. 
121 ibid, para 39. 
122 Levez (n 118), paras 9–12. 
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always extend their most beneficial rules to actions based on EU law, but 
that national courts have to consider both the purpose and essential 
characteristics of the alleged similar claims. Once the national courts have 
established a national claim suitable for comparison they must to compare 
the procedural rules applicable to these claims by reviewing the role of the 
provisions in the procedure viewed as a whole. The ECJ thus confirmed that 
the test adopted in van Schijndel and Peterbroeck applies also to the 
principle of equivalence.123 
In the proceedings, the United Kingdom argued that since claims based on 
the national law that transposed the directive at hand could be brought under 
the same procedural rules as claims based on EU law, the principle of 
equivalence was not breached. The court rejected this argument, since such 
actions are in fact one and the same, meaning that they, by definition, are 
not comparable.124 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom had argued that it was possible for Mrs 
Levez to bring an action before a regular court, a procedure for which the 
same time limit did not apply. The court held that in that regard it had to be 
examined whether or not an applicant would then be put in a less favourable 
position than that of applicants bringing an action to the Industrial Tribunal 
based on similar domestic claims. As examples of relevant factors, the court 
mentioned that the Industrial Tribunal was not as costly and took less time 
to settle a dispute, leading to greater convenience for the applicant.125 
The ECJ concluded that 
the answer to the question referred to the Court must be that 
Community law, as it stands at present, does not preclude a 
Member State from requiring any action for reparation of the 
loss or damage sustained as a result of the belated transposition 
of the Directive to be brought within a limitation period of one 
year from the date of its transposition into national law, 
provided that that procedural requirement is no less favourable 
than procedural requirements in respect of similar actions of a 
domestic nature.126 
The cases of Palmisani and Levez exemplify several traits of the principle of 
equivalence, capable of explaining the ECJ’s lesser interest in compared to 
the principle of effectiveness. 
One such trait is that it is for national courts to decide upon the 
compatibility of national legislation with the principle of equivalence. A 
detailed guidance by the ECJ leading to a clear conclusion, such as that in 
Levez, is very rare. At first glance the discrepancy between the ECJ’s more 
detailed scrutiny, when examining the principle of effectiveness and its 
more lenient approach when scrutinising the principle of equivalence may 
123 ibid, paras 39–44. 
124 ibid, para 47. 
125 ibid, para 51. 
126 ibid, para 53. 
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seem odd. However, the underlying rationale is clear. The principle of 
effectiveness is stated to ensure the effective application of EU law, 
meaning that the focus on the judicial evaluation lies on the features of EU 
law, and explaining what the effective application of it entails. In contrast, 
the principle of equivalence is focused on comparing national legal regimes, 
and their application in the national procedure as a whole. A task that the 
ECJ is badly fit to conduct, since it is impossible for it to gather and 
maintain as detailed knowledge of national rules in all of the Member States 
as that of the national courts. 
Another explanation is that, from a EU law point of view, the principle of 
equivalence is much clearer than the principle of effectiveness. It consists, 
as is shown in Levez, of a two-staged evaluation, beginning by first finding a 
comparable claim based on national law, and secondly comparing the 
national remedies and procedures applicable in the different situations. The 
substantive evaluation is based on national law, and it is therefore natural 
that the principle itself has not evolved greatly since it was adopted in Rewe. 
On that note, the ECJ’s conclusion in Palmisani, that there is no breach of 
the principle of equivalence if no comparator can be found, provides an 
additional explanation. Since many of the rights under EU law, by their 
nature, lacks a comparator in national law the alleged breaches of the 
principle of equivalence are likely to be fewer than those regarding the 
principle of effectiveness. The rights in the Patient Rights Directive127 can 
serve as a fitting example of this. Since it regulates the right of patients to 
seek, and be reimbursed for, cross-border healthcare it is not easy to imagine 
a comparable situation in national law. 
127 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 
on the Application of Patients’ Rights in Cross-border Healthcare [2011] OJ L88/45. 
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3 Case Law Labelled Effective 
Judicial Protection 
3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned, the case law of the CJEU textually differentiates between the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness on the one hand, and the 
principle of effective judicial protection on the other. However, the CJEU 
has not clarified the relationship between them. As will be shown in chapter 
five there is case law indicating that the two concepts can be used 
simultaneously, 128  but there is also case law that clearly distinguishes 
between the two principles, 129 albeit without clearly explaining why the 
differentiation is made. 
Therefore, it is of value to describe the principle of effective judicial 
protection separately from the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, 
both to highlight the mere fact that they are separate principles, and to 
examine them on their own merits, to avoid confusion between them. Once 
both sets of principles have been analysed, it becomes appropriate to 
examine how they relate to each other.  
In this chapter, cases in which the ECJ examines the compatibility of 
national procedural rules with the principle of ‘effective judicial protection’ 
will be described.130 
It should be mentioned that some scholars do not clearly separate between 
the principles. Johanna Engström, who successfully defended a doctoral 
thesis on the principle of effectiveness, takes the view that there is a general 
principle of effective judicial protection that, in turn, contains two ‘macro-
requirements’, being the overarching principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness described in the previous chapter.131 This categorisation is not 
chosen in this thesis, since such a categorisation assumes that the ECJ has 
not intended to differentiate between the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness one the one hand, and the principle of effective judicial 
protection on the other. Instead, it assumes that they are part of the same 
general principle. This thesis seeks to examine the actual approach taken by 
128 Case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v Justitiekanslern 
[2007] ECR I-2271. 
129 Case C-279/09 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010] ECR I-13849. 
130 In some cases the ECJ instead refers to ‘effective judicial control’ or ‘effective judicial 
remedy’. However, through references in subsequent case law it has become clear that they 
refer to the same principle. The fact that the court makes a reference to effective judicial 
protection has been the determining factor for selecting cases in this chapter. 
131 Johanna Engström, The Europeanisation of Remedies and Procedures through Judge-
made Law: Can a Trojan Horse achieve Effectiveness? (European University Institute 
2009) 50–54. 
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the ECJ in evaluating national procedural legislation against the principle of 
effective judicial protection, and therefore seeks to avoid linguistic 
constructions of the court’s methodology. In other words, this thesis does 
not assume that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness and effective 
judicial protection are two sides (or part of) the same coin. 
Nevertheless, it can hardly be disputed that the case law labelled effective 
judicial protection and the case law related to the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness are closely connected. They occurred in the same period in 
time, and concerned similar situations, namely situations where the 
conformity of national procedural rules with EU law was questioned. In 
order to analyse why the ECJ adopted different approaches a summary of 
the relevant case law is appropriate. 
3.2 Cases 
The court’s reliance on the concept of effective judicial protection 
originated in the cases of von Colson132 and Dorit Harz133 delivered on the 
same day. 
The case of von Colson concerned two women who had applied for 
positions as social workers at a German prison. They were not hired, and 
instead the positions were filled by two male applicants. The two women 
brought an action to national courts claiming that they had been 
discriminated on the basis of sex. They relied upon national legislation said 
to implement a directive governing equal treatment of men and women. 
Primarily, they wanted to be offered the positions that they had been denied 
and secondarily they sought damages amounting to six months pay and 
reimbursement for travel costs occurred during the hiring process.134 
The national court established that the women had been the victim of 
discrimination, but at the same time found that it could not order the hiring 
of the women, nor the payment of damages for a ‘positive interest’. National 
law only provided for the reimbursement of actual costs. The national court 
could therefore only order the reimbursement of travel expenses, but the 
court nevertheless decided to halt the proceedings to refer questions to the 
ECJ on whether EU law demanded other remedies than those available, such 
as the awarding of damages or the offering of the job that was denied.135 
The ECJ stated that a full implementation of the directive did not require a 
specific sanction to be enacted against prohibited discrimination, but that it 
does entail an obligation to ensure that the chosen sanction is such as to 
guarantee real and effective judicial protection. It also had to have a real 
deterrent effect on the employer. The court held that it follows that if a 
Member State chooses to award compensation for breaches of the 
132 Case C-14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 
[1984] ECR 01891. 
133 Case C-79/83 Dorit Harz v Deutsche Tradax GmbH [1984] ECR 01921. 
134 von Colson (n 132), 1893. 
135 ibid, para 6. 
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prohibition on discrimination that compensation must be adequate in 
relation to the sustained damage.136 
The court continued its reasoning by emphasising that it is for the Member 
State to choose between different penalties suitable for achieving the 
objective of the directive. The penalty chosen did however have to comply 
with the demands of real effective judicial protection and provide a real 
deterring effect. This meant that compensation based on purely nominal 
factors, such as only reimbursing costs incurred in the application process, 
was not in conformity with EU law. The court then left it to the national 
court to utilise the guidance provided in order to interpret and apply the 
national legislation adopted to implement the directive.137 
von Colson is thus a judgment that is respectful of national procedural 
autonomy in the sense that the ECJ underlined that it is for Member States 
to choose the remedy they wish to enact. It is however also clear that their 
choice of remedy is not entirely free. The ECJ states that the member States 
are free to choose between suitable remedies, indicating that the court could 
take upon itself to evaluate not only the features of the chosen remedy, as in 
the case at hand, but also the remedy itself. The ECJ was furthermore clear 
on the fact that even if the chosen remedy is deemed suitable it is still 
subject to two additional demands, that of ensuring effective judicial 
protection and that of it acting as a deterrent for potential discriminators. 
The court confirmed its reasoning in Dorit Harz.138 
Approximately six months after the delivery of von Colson and Dorit Harz 
the ECJ delivered another judgment concerning what it phrased as effective 
judicial control and effective judicial remedies. The case of Johnston 139 
concerned a female police officer in Northern Ireland who challenged a 
decision of the Chief Constable not to renew her contract of employment. 
The decision was due to a redundancy of female police officers in Northern 
Ireland that followed from another decision adopted by the Chief Constable 
not to allow female police officers to carry arms. 
In the United Kingdom, police officers generally do not carry firearms, but 
that general rule did not apply in Northern Ireland at the time. Due to 
terrorist activities male police officers were not just allowed, but obliged to 
carry arms. The reason for refusing female police officers the possibility to 
carry arms, or even receive weapons training, was based on a belief that it 
would make them more likely targets for assassination. 140  The Chief 
Constable decided that general police work required police officers to be 
armed, limiting the tasks that female police officers could carry out and 
therefore causing a reduced demand for female police officers. 
136 ibid, para 23. 
137 ibid, para 28. 
138 Dorit Harz (n 133), paras 23–25. 
139 Case C-222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
[1986] ECR 01651. 
140 ibid, 1665. 
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Mrs Johnston challenged the decision not to renew her contract, and 
demanded weapons training. She contended that she had suffered unlawful 
discrimination and referred directly to EU secondary legislation due to the 
fact that the applicable national legislation allowed for sex discrimination if 
done for the purpose of safeguarding national security or of protecting 
public safety or public order, as was claimed by the Chief Constable to be 
the case. Adjacent to the applicable provisions of national law there was a 
subparagraph stating that if the Secretary of State signed a certificate, stating 
that the purpose of an act was that of safeguarding national security or of 
protecting public safety or public order, it should serve as sufficient 
evidence that this was in fact the case. This subparagraph thus prevented the 
national courts from performing a judicial review of what the purpose of an 
act actually was.141 
The Industrial Tribunal handling the case referred several questions to the 
ECJ, who on its own notion rephrased them, dealing first with the issue of 
‘the right to an effective judicial remedy’.142 
The court began by stating that there existed a right to judicial review 
stemming from the secondary legislation in question.143 In the subsequent 
paragraph, the court elaborated that that requirement was an expression of a 
general principle of EU law, stemming from constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States. The court also stated that the same principle 
is also laid down in the ECHR, and that the principles on which the ECHR 
is based must be taken into consideration in EU law.144 
The court then found that any national provision stating that a certificate 
was sufficient evidence to justify derogations from the principle of equal 
treatment allowed the competent authority to deprive an individual of the 
possibility to ascertain rights conferred by EU law in judicial proceedings, 
and therefore is contrary to the principle of effective judicial control.145 
The ECJ thus gave a clear judgment in finding that there is a right to access 
to court under EU law. The judgment is equally clear in pointing out three 
legal sources for this right: secondary law, constitutional principles common 
to the Member States, and the principles underlying the ECHR. It however 
limited the importance of the two latter sources, by stating that it was by 
virtue of the Directive at hand, ‘interpreted in the light of the general 
principle’ established by the common constitutional principles and the 
ECHR, that all persons had ‘the right to obtain an effective remedy in a 
competent court’. The court furthermore held that it is a task of national 
courts to ensure compliance with these rights in relation to applicable 
provisions of EU law and the national legislation intended to implement 
it.146 
141 ibid, para 3. 
142 ibid, headline to paras 13–21. 
143 ibid, para 17. 
144 ibid, para 18. 
145 ibid, para 20. 
146 ibid, para 19. 
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A few months later, the ECJ again got a chance to elaborate on what it 
referred to as effective judicial review. The case of Heylens147 concerned the 
famous Belgian football trainer Georges Heylens, who moved to France to 
train the professional football team in Lille. In order to be allowed to 
exercise the profession of football trainer in France you, at the time, had to 
be a holder of a football trainer’s diploma or a foreign diploma that had been 
recognised as equivalent by decision of the Government, after the 
consultation of a special committee. Mr Heylens had earned a Belgian 
diploma that he sought recognition for in France, but his application was 
denied by the government on the basis of the special committee’s opinion. 
The opinion in itself did not state any reasons for recommending that the 
diploma should not be recognised. Mr Heylens continued to exercise his 
profession, causing the French football-trainers’ trade union to bring Mr 
Heylens and his employer before the criminal court in Lille.148 
The court suspended its proceedings in order to refer a question to the ECJ 
on whether the French legislation complied with the free movement 
provisions of the EU treaties. The national court’s concern was primarily 
with the fact that the committee did not state its reasons and that there 
existed no particular remedy against its opinion.149 
The court began by stating that since the free movement of workers is a 
fundamental objective of the Union there is a requirement on Member States 
to secure it under national laws and regulations. The court elaborated that 
this requirement stems from the principle of sincere cooperation, now 
entailed in Article 4(3) TEU. According to the court, this obligation means 
that  
Member States are bound to take all appropriate measures, 
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of the Treaty and to abstain from any 
measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives 
of the Treaty.150 
The court then explained what this requirement meant particularly for the 
recognition of diplomas, finding that the task of reconciling the need to 
ascertain qualifications with the need to ensure free movement required 
Member States to enact a certain procedure. It also elaborated on the 
features of the procedure, finding that it had to enable authorities to assure 
themselves, on an objective basis, that the foreign diploma certified that the 
holder had attained the same or equivalent knowledge and qualifications as 
a person certified with a national diploma. The assessment was, according to 
the court, to be done exclusively in light of the knowledge and qualifications 
that the holder could be assumed to possess in light of the diploma, with 
147 Case C-222/86 Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du 
football (Unectef) v Georges Heylens and others [1987] ECR 04097. 
148 ibid, paras 2–4. 
149 ibid, para 5. 
150 ibid, para 12. 
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regard being taken to the nature, duration and practical training in the 
studies underlying it.151 
Before answering the national court’s question, the ECJ thus seems to have 
engaged in guidance to the national court on how the administrative 
procedure leading to an opinion of the committee, and subsequently a 
decision by the government, must be conducted in order to comply with EU 
law.152 
In answering the question of the national court, the ECJ stated that since 
access to court is a right individually conferred by Union law on each 
worker the existence of a judicial remedy is essential in order to secure for 
the individual effective protection of his or her right. It then made reference 
to Johnston and its findings that this principle reflects a general principle of 
EU law based on constitutional traditions common to the Member States 
and enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.153  
The ECJ’s conclusion was that a national authority is either obliged to state 
reasons in the decision itself or in a subsequent communication made at the 
request of a party. The court motivated its conclusion by stating that 
effective judicial review must be able to cover the legality of reasons for a 
decision, which in general presupposes that the judicial body reviewing the 
decision can require the national authority to state them upon request. 
However, in cases concerning the effective protection of a fundamental right 
conferred to individuals by the treaties, as was the case in Heylens, the court 
held that the requirements are stricter. In such cases, individuals must be 
able to defend their rights under the best possible conditions, and have the 
possibility of deciding with a full knowledge of the relevant facts in order to 
be able to assess whether or not there is any point in appealing to the 
courts.154 
However, the court made it clear that its reasoning did not extend to 
opinions and other measures occurring in the preparatory or investigatory 
stages. The stated requirements thus solely apply to final decisions.155 
In summary, Heylens shows the ECJ engaging in a detailed review of the 
administrative process of Member States. It did not mention its 
Rewe-formula stating that it is for national courts to apply their national 
procedural legislation, nor did use its terminology related to the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness. The court also stated that the right to 
effective judicial review in cases such as Heylens belongs to each individual. 
This is perhaps not revolutionary, given the express connection to the 
151 ibid, para 13. 
152 This indicates that there is a right to good administration under EU law, which is 
interesting in relation to the question of what scope Article 41 of the Charter has, see 
section 4.3.3 below. 
153 Heylens (n 147), para 13. 
154 ibid, para 15. 
155 ibid, para 16. 
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ECHR, but it is nevertheless noteworthy that the court seems to have shifted 
the protective purpose, from the effective application of EU law to the rights 
of each individual to ascertain his or her rights conferred by EU law. 
A couple of years later the ECJ for the first time approached the relationship 
between the principle of effective judicial protection and the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness. It did so by reference, in stating that national 
legislation could not undermine the right to effective judicial protection as 
set forth in Johnston and Heylens, nor could it render it virtually impossible 
to exercise rights conferred by EU law, as held in San Giorgio.156 The court 
thus clarified that it viewed the principle of effective judicial protection as 
something separate from the principle of effectiveness. Furthermore, the 
court provided a link between Johnston and Heylens, stating that they both 
concerned the principle of effective judicial protection even though Heylens 
does not explicitly mention it. 
In this regard, it would be wrong not to mention Marshall II157, a case 
regarding equal treatment in relation to age. The case concerned a woman 
who had been wrongfully dismissed, 158  and the issue of what level of 
compensation she should be granted as a result. The court developed its 
reasoning in von Colson by first confirming that even though a directive 
does not prescribe the measures for its transposition into national law it 
nevertheless imposes an obligation on Member States to take the necessary 
measures to implement it correctly. Secondly, it held that if the Member 
State did not fulfil its obligation the purposes of the directive at hand, being 
‘to arrive at real equality of opportunity’159, could not be met unless there 
were ‘measures appropriate to restore such equality when it had not been 
observed’.160 
Such measures had to take account of the particular circumstances of each 
breach and could therefore not be subject to an upper limit of financial 
compensation.161 Furthermore, such compensation ‘must enable the loss and 
damage actually sustained as a result of the discriminatory dismissal to be 
made good in full in accordance with the applicable national rules’.162 As a 
result, national legislation could not 
leave out of account factors, such as the effluxion of time, which 
may in fact reduce its value. The award of interest, in 
accordance with the applicable national rules, must therefore be 
156 Joined case C-87/90, C-88/90 and C-89/90 A. Verholen and others v Sociale 
Verzekeringsbank Amsterdam [1991] ECR I-03757, para 24. 
157 Case C-271/91 M. Helen Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area 
Health Authority [1993] ECR I-04367. 
158 Case C-152/84 M. H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health 
Authority (Teaching) [1986] ECR 00723. 
159 Marshall II (n 157), para 24. 
160 ibid. 
161 ibid, para 30. 
162 ibid, para 26. 
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regarded as an essential component of compensation for the 
purposes of restoring real equality of treatment.163 
In Marshall II the court thus took a quite intrusive position in finding that 
national legislation prescribing a cap on financial compensation of damages 
was not compatible with EU law. This is more so as it also held that national 
legislation could not exclude the awarding of interest. It is, however, worthy 
of noting that the court reached its conclusion by making several references 
to the national legislation of Member States, thus showing that the court 
does not require a specific method or means of reaching a remedy – it 
merely required the existence of a remedy, and that that remedy had to ‘be 
such as to guarantee real and effective judicial protection and have a real 
deterrent effect on the employer’.164 
The court has developed the concept of effective judicial review further in 
other cases. It has for example stated that it applies to economic agents, who, 
on the basis of the principle, were allowed to bring actions for damages 
sustained through following a EU regulation that was later invalidated by 
the ECJ, even though the court in its invalidation limited the retroactive 
effects in a way that would otherwise have excluded part of the damages.165 
The court thus applied the principle to protect private parties in the event of 
a breach of EU law by the institutions.166 
163 ibid, para 31. 
164 ibid, para 24. 
165 Case C-228/92 Roquette Frères SA v Hauptzollamt Geldern [1994] ECR I-01445. 
166 Case C-212/94 FMC plc, FMC (Meat) Ltd, DT Duggins Ltd, Marshall (Lamberhurst) 
Ltd, Montelupo Ltd and North Devon Meat Ltd v Intervention Board for Agricultural 
Produce and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1996] ECR I-00389, paras 58 
and 62. 
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4 Statutory Law 
4.1 Introduction 
As described in the first chapter, the legal landscape surrounding effective 
judicial protection has evolved to incorporate both case law and statutory 
law. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the latter has gained 
importance through the entry into force of several statutes in the Charter and 
the TEU. This chapter gives a brief overview of the statutes governing 
effective judicial protection, both in the TEU, the Charter and the ECHR. It 
is very descriptive to its nature, leaving the application of the described 
statutes by the ECJ for chapter five. 
4.2 Article 19(1) TEU 
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court of Justice, 
the General Court and specialised courts. It shall ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed. 
Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal 
protection in the fields covered by Union law. 
Article 19(1) TEU governs the division of competences between the CJEU 
and the Member States, including, national courts. 
The obligation of Member States to ensure ‘effective legal protection’ is a 
novelty in EU law, introduced in the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force 
on 1 December 2009. This new Article entails at least three interesting 
aspects. 
The first is to put the responsibility of effective legal protection on the 
Member States, and not the Union itself. This is a codification of the 
division of responsibilities established in the case law of the CJEU, leaving 
discretion to Member States as long as they comply with the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness. There is no mentioning of the principle of 
sincere cooperation167 in the text of Article 19 TEU, but when the principle 
is traced back to cases such as Rewe168 and Factortame I169 the link to the 
principle of effective legal protection is found. In those cases, the court 
explicitly states that the right to legal protection is derived from the direct 
167 Codified in Article 4(3) TEU. 
168 Case Case C-33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v 
Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 01989. 
169 Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd 
and others [1990] ECR I-02433. 
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effect of EU law, and that its enforcement is entrusted the Member States on 
the basis of the principle of sincere cooperation.170 
The second aspect to note is that Article 19(1) TEU regulates effective legal 
protection, and not effective judicial protection, indicating a difference 
compared to the principle of effective judicial protection. It is, however, 
uncertain whether the case law of the ECJ supports such a differentiation.  
Much like the principle of effective judicial protection and the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness, Article 19(1) TEU concerns national 
remedies ensuring the effective protection of rights given by EU law. This 
would indicate that the difference between the wording of Article 19(1) 
TEU and the wording of the principle of effective judicial protection is not 
to be overestimated. This interpretation also seems to be the one adopted by 
the ECJ. In Inuit171, the court stated without further elaboration, that the 
principle of effective judicial protection is ‘reaffirmed by the second 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU’.172 
There is not much case law developing the meaning, or indeed the 
importance, of Article 19(1) TEU. Only five cases from the ECJ mention it, 
amongst those is however Pringle173, a case marking a rare event, since the 
ECJ sat as a full court. In Pringle, Article 19 TEU was used to emphasise 
the responsibility of the CJEU to ensure that EU law is upheld. 174  In 
Telefónica 175  Article 19 TEU was used as a base for the shared 
responsibility of judicial review, finding that it falls on both the CJEU and 
the national courts to ensure the judicial review of compliance with EU 
law. 176  Telefónica thus indicates that Article 19 TEU is a competence 
provision, governing the jurisdiction of national courts to act in matters 
regarding effective legal and judicial protection.  
There are still many questions to be answered regarding the role of Article 
19(1) TEU and its relationship to the principle of effective judicial 
protection. However, an early conclusion drawing on Inuit and Telefónica 
would be that it is to be used as a legal basis for the obligation of both the 
CJEU and national courts to ensure effective judicial protection, thus 
functioning much like the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) 
TEU. 
170 Rewe (n 168), para 5, and ibid, para 19. 
171 Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament, Council of 
the European Union, Kingdom of the Netherlands, European Commission [2013] 
OJ C344/11. 
172 ibid, paras 100–101. 
173 Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney 
General [2012] OJ C26/15. 
174 ibid, para 35. 
175 Case C-274/12 P Telefónica SA v European Commission [2013] OJ C52/12. 
176 ibid, para 57. 
 35 
                                                 
4.3 The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The importance of the Charter for effective judicial protection is shown by 
the increasing amount of requests for preliminary rulings by national courts 
concerning Charter provisions.177  
Effective judicial protection is codified in several Charter provisions, the 
most obvious of which is Article 47. Koen Lenaerts, vice president of the 
ECJ, has described the principle of effective judicial protection as being 
‘enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter’178, a statement confirmed by case 
law.179 However, elements of the principle of effective judicial protection 
can also be found in Article 41, governing the right to good administration. 
Both Articles will therefore be described. Given the Charter’s importance, it 
is appropriate to begin with a short description of the Charter’s background, 
content and scope of application. 
4.3.1 Background 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is the first 
legally binding catalogue of human and fundamental rights in the European 
Union. It was proclaimed by the presidents of the Commission, the Council 
and the Parliament in 2000 following a Council meeting in Nice.180 At that 
point it was not legally binding, it took nine years for it to become so 
through the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. 
Since then, Article 6(1) TEU has proclaimed that the Charter shall have the 
same legal value as the treaties. It is, in other words, primary EU law.181 
The Charter was however referred to in the case law of the ECJ182 and the 
opinions of Advocate Generals183 even before its entry into force, signalling 
177 European Commission, ‘2013 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’ COM (2014) 224 Final 10. 
178 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Effective Judicial Protection in the EU’ (Assises de la justice 
conference, Brussels, November 2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-
2013/files/interventions/koenlenarts.pdf> accessed 23 May 2014, 1. 
179 Case C-279/09 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010] ECR I-13849, para 33. 
180 See reference in the Official Journal, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union [2000] OJ C364/1. 
181 Regarding the general importance of the Charter after the Lisbon treaty, see Juliane 
Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
after Lisbon’ (2010) EUI Working Papers AEL 2010/6 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/15208> accessed 2 May 2014, and Xavier Groussot and 
Laurent Pech, ‘Fundamental Rights Protection in the European Union post Lisbon Treaty’ 
(2010) Fondation Robert Schuman Policy Paper <http://www.robert-
schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-173-en.pdf> accessed 2 May 2014. 
182 The first reference to it by the ECJ was in Case C-540/03 European Parliament v 
Council of the European Union [2006] ECR I-5769, para 38. 
183 The first reference by an Advocate general came earlier in the opinion of AG Tizzano in 
Case C-173/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte 
Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union (BECTU) [2001] 
ECR I-04881, paras 26 and 28. 
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its importance.184 Already during the few years since the Charter’s entry 
into force, it has become an important legal instrument in EU law. Gráinne 
de Búrca found that only between 2009 and 2012 the ECJ made reference to, 
or drew on, the Charter in at least 122 cases. In 27 of those cases the court 
substantively engaged in arguments based on the Charter. During the same 
time period, the General Court referred to the Charter in at least 37 cases, 
and substantively engaged in argumentation based on it in seven of those.185 
De Búrca further identifies an increase in rights-based arguments before the 
CJEU and attributes it to the entry into force of Charter along with the 
expanded scope of EU law and the extended jurisdiction of the CJEU.186 
Daniel Sarmiento also emphasises the importance of the Charter since its 
entry into force and summarises its relatively short history like this: 
With the benefit of hindsight, it can now be said that the Charter 
has been the source of very significant changes in EU law. Far 
from being a decorative declaration validating past practices, the 
Charter has forced the Union to take fundamental rights even 
more seriously, a move that has consequently pushed the ECJ in 
the same direction.187 
This is true not in the least regarding the rights, freedoms and principles that 
came new into EU with the adoption of the Charter, and therefore had never 
been addressed by the CJEU before. 
Even so, the court has been accused of steering away from key questions 
relating to the Charter by avoiding to refer to it altogether, and instead 
operate in the gray shade ‘between judicial minimalism and avoidance’, as 
Laurent Pech phrases it.188 
4.3.2 Structure and Content 
The Charter is divided into seven chapters,189 consisting of altogether 54 
Articles that contain rights, freedoms or principles.190 The first chapter is 
184 Kokott (n 181), 1. 
185 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as 
a Human Rights Adjudicator?’ (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 168. 
186 ibid, 2. 
187 Daniel Sarmiento, ‘Who’s Afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, National Courts 
and the New Framework of Fundamental Rights in Europe’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 1267, 
1270. 
188 Laurent Pech, ’Between Judicial Minimalism and Avoidance: The Court of Justice’s 
Sidestepping of Fundamental Constitutional Issues in Römer and Dominguez’ (2012) 49 
CML Rev 1841. A recent example from the case law of the ECJ is case C-176/12 
Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT and Others [2014] OJ 
C85/3, where the ECJ had the possibility of clarifying the difference between rights and 
principles in Article 52/5) of the Charter, an opportunity grasped by Advocate General Cruz 
Villalón in his opinion in the case, but ignored by the court. 
189 The chapters are Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizen’s rights, Justice and 
General provisions. 
190 See Article 52(1) and 52(5) of the Charter. 
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entitled Dignity and the first Article begins by stating that human dignity is 
inviolable, much inspired by the German constitution. 191 Hans Christian 
Krüger describes this initial statement as being the foundation for all human 
and fundamental rights.192 In legal philosophy, that idea has been argued by 
Ronald Dworkin. 193  The Charter is, however, far from a minimalist 
declaration of negative rights – on the contrary, it contains several social 
and positive rights.194 
Some of the provisions in the Charter were previously known as general 
principles of EU law, established in case law of the ECJ predating the 
drafting of the Charter. 195  Other provisions were new to EU law, but 
familiar from their existence in the ECHR,196 which is closely connected to 
charter as described in section 4.3.4 below. 
4.3.3 Scope of Application 
After the entry into force of the Charter, a debate over its scope of 
application arose. Some scholars argued that the ECJ had now become ‘a 
second European Court on Human Rights’ and that the EU itself had 
become a ‘human rights organisation’. 197  This was opposed by other 
scholars such as Koen Lenaerts, vice president of the ECJ, who reached the 
conclusion that such far-reaching effects cannot be drawn from the Charter. 
Instead, he relies upon Article 51(1) of the Charter in arguing that the 
Charter does not extend the scope of application of EU law, and thus 
ensures that the principle of conferral is being respected. 198  However, 
relying on Article 51(1) of the Charter is problematic. Its text namely 
prescribes that the Charter is only applicable to Member States when 
implementing EU law. The ECJ had however held in several cases predating 
the Charter that individuals could rely on fundamental rights also when 
Member States were derogating from EU law.199 
191 Article 1 of the Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland begins with ‘Die 
Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar’. 
192 Hans Christian Krüger, ’The European Union Charter and the European Convention on 
Human Rights: An Overview’ in Steve Peers and Angela Ward (eds), The European Union 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart Publishing 2004). 
193 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press 2011) 417–423. 
194 For an overview of social rights in EU law, see Phil Syrpis and Tonia Novitz, 
‘Economic and Social Rights in Conflict: Political and Judicial Approaches to the 
Reconciliation’ (2008) 33 European Law Review 411. 
195 Article 47 of the Charter is one example, see the Explanations Relating to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17. 
196 Article 19 of the Charter is a good example of this, see ibid. The link between the ECHR 
and general principles of EU law was established long before the drafting of the Charter 
through Nold, see section 4.3.4 below. 
197 See Koen Lenaerts, ’Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ 
(2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review 375, 377 who is of the opposite opinion, but 
in a clear and concise way summarises the opinions of his adversaries. 
198 ibid. 
199 See Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia 
Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos 
Avdellas and others [1993] ECR I-02925 and for a good categorization of case law on the 
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That debate was settled in Åkerberg Fransson, 200  a case concerning a 
fisherman in the small village of Kalix in the northern parts of Sweden. The 
question of the scope of the Charter arose in relation to the fisherman’s 
indictment for tax evasion. At the time of his prosecution for tax crimes he 
had already, in accordance with national law, been imposed an 
administrative fee. His defence argued that this two-step procedure 
constituted a breach of the ne bis in idem prohibition in Article 50 of the 
Charter. Since the questioned national legislation was a general procedural 
scheme, not adopted to implement EU law, the ECJ had to rule on the 
Charter’s applicability. The court held that fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the Charter were binding on the Member States when acting within the 
scope of EU law,201 and very clearly concluded: 
Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must 
therefore be complied with where national legislation falls 
within the scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist 
which are covered in that way by European Union law without 
those fundamental rights being applicable. The applicability of 
European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Charter.202 
Since Åkerberg Fransson it is thus clear that the Charter is applicable 
whenever EU law is applicable, meaning that Article 51(1) does not limit 
the scope of fundamental rights in EU law. It is still, however unclear what 
national actions constitute implementing actions, and what degree of 
connectivity to EU law that will suffice to trigger the application of the 
Charter.203 
4.3.4 The Link Between the Charter and the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
Though it was already established case law that fundamental rights as 
expressed in the ECHR constitutes general principles of EU law,204 the TEU 
and the Charter provide the first explicit legislative link between EU law 
and the ECHR. Article 6(3) TEU brings the fundamental rights of the ECHR 
issue Xavier Groussot, Laurent Pech and Gunnar Þór Pétursson, ’The Scope of EU 
Fundamental Rights on Member States’ Action: In Search of Certainty in EU Adjudication’ 
(2011) Eric Stein Working Paper No 1/2011 
<http://www.ericsteinpapers.cz/images/doc/eswp-2011-01-groussot.pdf> accessed 4 May 
2014. 
200 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013] OJ C114/7. 
201 ibid, para 20. 
202 ibid, para 21 (emphasis added). 
203 See Emily Hancox, ’The Meaning of ”implementing” EU Law Under Article 51(1) of 
the Charter: Åkerberg Fransson’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 1411, 1430–1431. 
204 Case C-4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European 
Communities [1974] ECR 00491. For a detailed description of the CJEU’s approach to 
ECHR-rights as general principles of EU law see Xavier Groussot, General Principles of 
Community Law (Europa Law Publishing 2006) ch 2 and Anthony Arnull, The European 
Union and its Court of Justice (2nd edn, OUP 2006) ch 10. 
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within the scope of EU law, by stating that they shall constitute general 
principles of EU law. Articles 52(3) and 53 of the Charter provide guidance 
on the relationship between the Charter and the ECHR. Article 52(3) by 
stating that the meaning and scope of Charter rights corresponding to ECHR 
rights shall be the same as the latter, 205  and Article 53 by stating that 
‘nothing in the Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely 
affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised’ by the 
ECHR. 
Article 6(2) TEU should also be mentioned in this context. It states 
explicitly that the EU shall accede to the ECHR. The accession of the EU to 
the ECHR has been subject to lengthy debate,206 as old as the EEC itself,207 
which falls outside the scope of this thesis. Article 6(2) was adopted after 
the delivery of an opinion by the ECJ, finding that under the then applicable 
treaties the EU had no competence to accede to the ECHR.208 Article 6(1) 
TEU does not prescribe a time limit, but the accession process commenced 
on the 26 May 2010 and is currently underway.209 
4.3.5 Article 47 of the Charter – Right to an 
Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance 
with the conditions laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by 
an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. 
Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and 
represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so 
far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. 
Article 47 of the Charter has the descriptive headline ‘Right to an Effective 
Remedy and to a Fair Trial’. It contains three paragraphs that guarantees, in 
order, the right to an effective remedy, the right to access a court and to 
receive a fair trial, and lastly, that those who lack sufficient resources should 
be provided legal aid in so far as it is necessary to ensure ‘effective access to 
justice’. 
205 This includes their interpretation in the case law of the ECtHR, which is apparent from 
the Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17. 
206 Best described in Paul Craig, ’EU accession to the ECHR: Competence, Procedure and 
Substance’ (2013) 36 Fordham International Law Journal 1114. 
207 ibid, 1150. 
208 See Opinion 2/94 On Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECR I-1759. 
209 See Council of Europe, ’Accession of the European Union’ <http://hub.coe.int/what-we-
do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-convention> accessed 4 May 2014, which describes 
the procedure and its current status. 
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The first paragraph, concerning the right to an effective remedy, is based on 
Article 13 of the ECHR, 210  but goes further in its protection since it 
guarantees an effective remedy before a court.211 The second paragraph of 
Article 47 of the Charter, concerning the access to court and a fair trial, is 
based on Article 6(1) of the ECHR.212 Like the first paragraph, it too goes 
further than the corresponding ECHR provision in that it does not limit itself 
to criminal proceedings or proceedings determining civil rights, but instead 
applies generally. This general application is seen as a corollary to the fact 
that the EU is a union based on the rule of law, as held by the ECJ in Les 
Verts.213 This grants it a considerably wider scope of substantive application 
since it, contrary to Article 6(1) ECHR, also applies to civil disputes, and 
even in purely administrative procedures. 
Article 47 of the Charter is a special right in that it operates in connection 
with other rights, not just in the Charter but also in EU law as a whole. In 
doing so, it has been said to reflect a mixture of the ECJ’s case law on 
Member State procedural rules and remedies, and the case law on the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness.214 Phrased differently, it is a 
procedural right given effect in relation to the process of safeguarding other 
rights of EU law. It lacks a self-standing material content, and instead 
gathers that from the wide palette of EU law rights, making it a flexible 
provision capable of influencing national procedural systems in many 
different ways depending on the material right in question.215 
The ECJ has held that the principle of effective judicial protection is 
‘confirmed by’216 and ‘enshrined in Article 47’217. Since the CJEU views 
Article 47 as a codification of the principle of effective judicial protection it 
is not strange that it refers relatively often to it.218 
Article 47 of the Charter is closely linked to other provisions of primary law. 
Article 41 of the Charter, governing the right to good administration, is one 
of them but also Article 19(1) requiring Member States to ensure effective 
210 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, 29. 
211 See Case C-222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary [1986] ECR 01651, para 59. 
212 Legal Explanations to the Charter (n 210) 30. 
213 Case C-294/83 Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v European Parliament [1986] ECR 01339, 
para 23. 
214 See Angela Ward ’Article 47 – Right to an Effective Remedy’ in Steve Peers, Tamara 
Harvey, Jeff Kenner and Angela Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A 
Commentary (Hart Publishing, forthcoming) 1210. 
215 ibid, 1211. 
216 Joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08 Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA (C-317/08), 
Filomena Califano v Wind SpA (C-318/08), Lucia Anna Giorgia Iacono v Telecom Italia 
SpA (C-319/08) and Multiservice Srl v Telecom Italia SpA (C-320/08) [2010] ECR I-2213, 
para 61. 
217 Case C-279/09 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010] ECR I-13849, para 33. 
218 Sacha Prechal and Rob Widdershoven, ‘Redefining the Relationship between “Rewe-
effectiveness” and Effective Judicial Protection’ (2011) 4 Review of European 
Administrative Law 31, 37. 
 41 
                                                 
legal protection in fields covered by EU law. The relationship between 
Charter rights for which provision is made in the treaties is governed by 
Article 52(2) of the Charter, stating that the former shall be ‘exercised under 
the conditions and within the limits’ defined by the treaties. Article 52(2) of 
the Charter thus provides a link between Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 
of the Charter, obliging national judges, under the principle of sincere 
cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU, to take into consideration Article 47 of the 
Charter when exercising their obligation to provide effective legal 
protection.219 
4.3.6 Article 41 of the Charter – Right to Good 
Administration 
1. Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, 
fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union. 
2. This right includes: 
(a) the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure 
which would affect him or her adversely is taken;(b the right of every person 
to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of 
confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy; 
(c) the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions. 
3. Every person has the right to have the Union make good any damage 
caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties, 
in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member 
States. 
4. Every person may write to the institutions of the Union in one of the 
languages of the Treaties and must have an answer in the same language. 
Article 41 of the Charter states that every person, hence not just EU citizens, 
has the right to good administration. Unlike Article 47 of the Charter, this is 
a substantive right with material content in several paragraphs. It is, in other 
words, not dependent of other rights to be operational. The material rights in 
Article 41 all stem from the general clause in paragraph one, stating that 
everyone has the right to have his or her affairs ‘handled impartially, fairly 
and within a reasonable time’. The subsequent paragraphs contain a list of 
examples of what this general clause entails, but it is a non-exhaustive list, 
which follows from the wording of paragraph two stating that the general 
clause ‘includes’ the subsequent norms. 
The right to good administration in Article 41 is closely linked to Article 47 
of the Charter through Article 41(2)(a), that contains the right to be heard. 
This right should be read in conjunction with Article 47(2) of the Charter, 
stating that the hearing should be in front of an independent and impartial 
219 Ward (n 214), 1212–1213. 
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tribunal established by law.220 Together they correspond to Article 6 of the 
ECHR,221 albeit providing broader protection.222 Article 47 also guarantees 
the right to an effective remedy, which of course is an important aspect of 
disputes relating to good administration. 
Article 41 is based on general principles of EU law as well as different 
provisions of the treaties. It is thus both a codification of case law as well as 
a repetition of pre-existing paragraphs. The fact that Article 41 is based on 
general principles is interesting in relation to its scope of application. Since 
general principles of EU law are binding upon Member States when acting 
within the scope of EU law it would be natural for Article 41 to have the 
same scope of application, but according to its wording, it is exclusively 
directed at the EU and all of its different institutions and bodies. The ECJ 
has not yet resolved the question of how this inconsistency is to be resolved. 
There is, in fact, case law supporting both the interpretation that Article 41 
is exclusively directed towards the EU223 and the interpretation that it is of 
general application,224 and thus binding on the Member States when acting 
within the scope of EU law. 
4.4 Articles 6(1) and 13 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
4.4.1 Relationship between EU law and the 
ECHR 
The relationship between EU law and the ECHR is a close one. As 
described in section 4.3.4 above there is, since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon treaty, an explicit connection between the TEU and the Charter on 
the one hand, and the ECHR on the other hand. The relationship, however, 
extends much further back in time than 2009. 
Fundamental rights, as expressed in the ECHR, has for long been held to be 
general principles of EU law. In Nold225 the court held that fundamental 
rights form an integral part of the general principles of EU law, and that 
‘international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
member states have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can 
220 The right to be heard before a court or tribunal had previously been established by case 
C-506/04 Graham J. Wilson v Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg [2006] ECR 
I-08613, para 47. 
221 Paul Craig ’Art 41 – Right to Good Administration’ in Steve Peers, Tamara Harvey, Jeff 
Kenner and Angela Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary 
(Hart Publishing, forthcoming) 1071. 
222 See headline 4.1.5. 
223 Case C-482/10 Teresa Cicala v Regione Siciliana [2011] ECR I-14139, para 28. 
224 Case C-277/11 M. M. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland, Attorney 
General [2012] OJ C26/9, para 84. 
225 Case C-4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European 
Communities [1974] ECR 00491. 
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supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of 
community law’.226 The next year, in the case of Rutili227, the court made its 
first explicit reference to the ECHR in its reasoning.228 The court has since 
often referred to the ECHR and it has been of paramount importance in 
cases regarding effective judicial protection, such as in Johnston, described 
in section 3.2 above. 
4.4.2 Article 6(1) ECHR 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be 
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order 
or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles 
or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent 
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
Article 6 of the ECHR concerns the right to a fair trial, but in addition to the 
rights explicitly mentioned in the wording, the ECtHR has also established 
that there is a right of access to court inherent in Article 6(1).229 
Article 6 has generated great attention in all of the states that are parties to 
the ECHR, due both to the importance of the right, but also due to the great 
number of cases that it has generated before the ECtHR. The ECtHR has 
stated that ‘the right to a fair trial holds so prominent a place in a democratic 
society that there can be no justification for interpreting Article 6 § 1 
restrictively’230, a conclusion that should be applied to all paragraphs of 
Article 6 ECHR. 231 That does not mean that Article 6 contains absolute 
rights. Limitations are accepted, as long as they do not impair the essence of 
the right. 232  Any limitation must also require a legitimate aim and be 
reasonably proportionate to the aim pursued.233 Furthermore, the rights in 
Article 6 must not only exist in theory but also be practical and effective, 
and ‘[t]his is particularly so of the right of access to the courts in view of the 
prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial’.234 
226 ibid, para 13. 
227 Case C-36/75 Roland Rutili v Ministre de l'intérieur [1975] ECR 01219. 
228 ibid, para 32. 
229 Golder v the United Kingdom App no 4451/70 (ECtHR 21 February 1975), para 36. 
230 Perez v France App no 47287/99 (ECtHR 12 February 2004), para 64. 
231 David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, Ed Bates and Carla Buckley, Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 201. 
232 De Geouffre de la Pradelle v France App no 12964/87 (ECtHR 16 December 1992), 
para 28. 
233 Ashingdane v the United Kingdom App no 8225/78 (ECtHR 28 May 1985), para 57. 
234 Airey v Ireland App no 6289/73 (ECtHR 9 October 1979), para 24. 
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In addition to the specific rights mentioned in Article 6, there is an overall 
requirement of a fair trial. 235 The content of this requirement cannot be 
determined in abstract, it can only be considered in the context of the 
judicial procedure in entirety, including the role of appeal proceedings.236 
This case-by-case evaluation bears a striking resemblance to the reasoning 
of the ECJ in van Schijndel and Peterboreck, described in section 2.3 above. 
It not certain that the legal tests are connected, but it is likely. 
Even though the requirement of a fair trial cannot be determined in abstract, 
a number of minimum requirements have nonetheless evolved through the 
case law of the ECtHR.  
The first of this is the requirement of ‘equality of arms’, meaning that there 
has to be a fair balance between the parties.237 Since the right of access to 
court is not absolute, there is no obligation on signatory states to provide 
total equality of arms, or to provide legal assistance to all citizens, 
regardless of financial status and prospect of winning.238 
Secondly, and in relation to equality of arms, the right to an adversarial 
process should be mentioned. The adversarial process means ‘the 
opportunity for the parties to have knowledge of and comment on the 
observations filed or evidence adduced by the other party’. 239  As a 
corollary, there is a right to disclosure of evidence, meaning that all relevant 
material is available to both parties.240 
Thirdly, Article 6(1) contains an inherent right to reasoned decisions.241 If a 
court delivers some reason for its decision there is a presumption that the 
requirement of stating reasons is met. This presumption can be rebutted by 
showing that the court has refused to address a cogent and relevant point 
brought by a party.242 The obligation to state reasons is thus a flexible right, 
to be applied on a case-by-case basis. The ECtHR has summed up the 
content of this right in Gorou where it stated that 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention obliges courts to give reasons 
for their decisions, but cannot be understood as requiring a 
detailed answer to every argument. The extent to which this duty 
applies may vary according to the nature of the decision. It is 
moreover necessary to take into account, inter alia, the diversity 
of the submissions that a litigant may bring before the courts and 
235 Robin C.A. White and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White, & Ovey, The European Convention 
on Human Rights (5th edn, OUP 2010) 260–261. 
236 Fejde v Sweden App no 12631/87 (ECtHR 29 October 1991), para 26. 
237 Neumeister v Austria App no 1936/63 (ECtHR 27 June 1968), para 22. 
238 Steel and Morris v the United Kingdom App no 68416/01 (ECtHR 15 February 2005), 
para 62. 
239 Ruiz-Mateos v Spain App no 12952/87 (ECtHR 23 June 1993), para 63. 
240 White and Ovey (n 235) 261–263. 
241 Van de Hurk v the Netherlands App no 16034/90 (ECtHR 19 April 1994), para 61. 
242 White and Ovey (n 235) 264, and Luka v Romania App no 34197/02 (ECtHR 21 July 
2009). 
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the differences existing in the Contracting States with regard to 
statutory provisions, customary rules, legal opinion and the 
presentation and drafting of judgments. That is why the question 
whether a court has failed to fulfil the obligation to state reasons, 
deriving from Article 6 § 1, can only be determined in the light 
of the circumstances of the case.243 
Fourthly, there is a right to appear before the court in person. This is also 
not an absolute right; it is a right that depends on the nature of the 
proceedings. In Kremzow, the ECtHR held that accused persons should 
generally be able to attend their trials. Since the hearings in the case were of 
crucial importance to the accused person, it was held to be essential for the 
fairness of the trial that he could attend it and be afforded the possibility to 
participate in it.244 In civil proceedings the same right applies, especially 
when it features of the concerned person is crucial for the elaboration of the 
court, for example, the sickness of a person seeking benefits.245 
Lastly, it must be stated that the abovementioned is not enough in itself to 
ascertain the right to a fair trial. There is in addition a demand of effective 
participation, focusing on the possibility of influencing, or at least 
participating in, the procedure. The ECtHR has held that there was no 
breach of Article 6(1) in a case where an applicant that was partly deaf and 
therefore could not hear all of the evidence given at the trial. The court 
based its decision on the fact that his legal counsel, who could hear the 
proceedings and communicate with his client throughout the proceedings, 
had chosen not to request his client to be seated closer to a witness for 
tactical reasons.246 In two other cases, involving two children accused of 
murdering another child, the court held that due to the media attention and 
the fact that there was evidence of the children suffering from posttraumatic 
stress syndrome, they were unlikely to have felt sufficiently uninhibited to 
consult their counsels. This constituted a breach of Article 6(1).247 A later 
case also arising in the United Kingdom concerned a child accused of 
robbery. Unlike the previously described cases, this case had not attracted 
attention in the media, and the procedure in court was different. For 
example, the court adjourned for breaks very often, the barristers and judges 
did not wear wigs or robes, and the accused child was allowed to sit with his 
social worker. Nonetheless, the ECtHR found a breach of Article 6(1) due to 
the fact that the child had an intellectual capacity of a much younger child, 
and that he appeared to have very little understanding of the proceedings 
and what the consequences could be for him.248 
243 Gorou v Greece App no 12686/03 (ECtHR 20 March 2009), para 37. 
244 Kremzow v Austria App no 12350/86 (ECtHR 21 September 1993), paras 67–68. 
245 Salomonsson v Sweden App no 38978/97 (ECtHR 12 November 2002). 
246 Stanford v the United Kingdom App no 16757/90 (ECtHR 23 February 1994). 
247 T v the United Kingdom App no 24724/94 (ECtHR 16 December 1999) and V v the 
United Kingdom App no 24888/94 (ECtHR 16 December 1999). 
248 SC v the United Kingdom App no 60958/00 (ECtHR 15 June 2004). 
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It should be pointed out that Article 6(1) applies both to criminal procedures 
and to civil rights proceedings, providing a likely explanation to the court’s 
findings that the substance of Article 6(1) vary depending on the procedure 
and circumstances at hand. 
4.4.3 Article 13 ECHR 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in 
an official capacity. 
The core of Article 13 ECHR is to provide a means with which individuals 
can obtain relief at a national level for violations of ECHR rights, before 
having to turn to the ECtHR.249 
The judicial system upholding ECHR is based on national courts 
maintaining it by applying national procedural rules and remedies. Article 
13 ECHR is a self-standing provision, meaning that there can be a breach of 
Article 13 without there being a breach of another Article of the convention. 
There must however be an arguable violation of another ECHR-right.250 The 
ECtHR has stated that an arguable complaint is not to be determined in 
abstract, but rather 
in the light of the particular facts and the nature of the legal 
issue or issues raised, whether each individual claim of violation 
forming the basis of a complaint under Article 13 (art. 13) was 
arguable and, if so, whether the requirements of Article 13 
(art. 13) were met in relation thereto.251 
The threshold is thus quite low; it seems that it is sufficient to identify an 
issue with the ECHR that merits further examination. The requirements on a 
claim to be arguable thus seem equal to those of it being admissible.252 
Article 13 requires effective remedies in national law, but it respects the 
national procedural autonomy of the signatory states. Each contracting state 
can themselves determine the forms of remedies offered to meet the 
obligations of Article 13. There is no need for the remedies to be judicial, 
but there is a requirement of them being effective. Article 13 requires 
signatory states to enact effective remedies, meaning that the national 
procedural autonomy is limited in regard of the very existence of remedies. 
249 Kudła v Poland App no 30210/96 (ECtHR 26 October 2000), para 152. 
250 Klass and others v Germany App no 5029/71 (ECtHR 6 September 1978), para 63. 
251 Boyle and Rice v the United Kingdom App no 9658/82 (ECtHR 27 April 1988), para 55. 
252 See Powell and Rayner v the United Kingdom App no 9310/81 (ECtHR 21 February 
1990), para 33 and White and Ovey (n 235) 134. 
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If a state cannot point out an available remedy before the ECtHR it is very 
likely to be in breach of Article 13.253  
When it has been ascertained that a remedy exists it must be examined to 
what extent that remedy is effective. The ECtHR has concluded its position 
on the required effectiveness like this: 
The scope of the Contracting States' obligations under Article 13 
varies depending on the nature of the applicant's complaint; 
however, the remedy required by Article 13 must be ‘effective’ 
in practice as well as in law. The ‘effectiveness’ of a ‘remedy’ 
within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the 
certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. Nor does the 
‘authority’ referred to in that provision necessarily have to be a 
judicial authority; but if it is not, its powers and the guarantees 
which it affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy 
before it is effective. Also, even if a single remedy does not by 
itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, the 
aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do 
so. 254 
The key features are thus that the effectiveness of a remedy varies 
depending on the case, but the remedy must be effective in practice as well 
as in law. Article 13 does not require a judicial remedy; the evaluation of 
effectiveness shall rather be made from the powers and guarantees it affords. 
As can be seen, there are several similarities between the concept of 
effective remedies in ECHR law and the principle of effectiveness in EU 
law. Both principles show respect for the national procedural autonomy of 
contracting states. Furthermore, the substantive content of the principles 
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. There are also differences, for 
instance Article 13 ECHR prescribes the creation of new remedies if none 
were to exist in national law, whilst EU law prescribes that Member States 
are not required to introduce new remedies in order to comply with EU 
law.255 However, as discussed in section 5.1 below, that strict rule has now 
been modified to require the creation of new remedies in some specific 
circumstances. 
253 Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v Austria App no 15153/89 
(ECtHR 19 December 1994), para 53. 
254 Čonka v Belgium App no 51564/99 (ECtHR 5 February 2002), para 75. 
255 Case C-158/80 Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH et Rewe-Markt Steffen v 
Hauptzollamt Kiel [1981] ECR 1805, para 44. 
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5 Application of Case Law and 
Statutes 
After describing the different principles and codifications governing the area 
it is of course important to examine how the ECJ has approached the issue 
of effective judicial protection once all instruments that govern it became 
available to the CJEU. In other words, once all of the tools are in the box it 
is of interest to examine which ones the court uses, and in what way. Such 
an examination is best conducted by examining the ECJ’s own judgments. 
Since the CJEU started to refer to the Charter before its entry into force, 
some of the judgments analysed below are examined even though they were 
delivered before the Lisbon treaty became legally binding.256 
5.1 Case C-432/05 Unibet 
Unibet 257  is the first judgment taking into account all of the legal 
instruments described in the preceding chapters, with the exception of 
Article 19(1). 258  The dispute arose when the British gambling company 
Unibet challenged the Swedish legislation prohibiting the marketing of 
gambling. It did so by placing adverts in several of the largest Swedish 
newspapers, knowing that this was contrary to national laws. The competent 
Swedish authorities immediately took action against the advertisements by 
seeking injunctions and initiating criminal proceedings against the 
newspapers who published the adverts. No proceedings were, however, 
brought against Unibet, who instead brought its own action for damages 
before national courts. After their demands were declared inadmissible by 
the national court of first instance (tingsrätten), Unibet appealed and 
demanded interim relief until the judicial proceedings had been settled. 259 
Under Swedish law there was no possibility for freestanding judicial review, 
the legality of norms could however be addressed as a preliminary issue in 
other actions, such as that for damages brought by Unibet.260 The national 
256 Several scholars have also used this approach to examine similar questions, see Dorota 
Leczykiewicz, ‘”Effective Judicial Protection” of Human Rights after Lisbon: Should 
National Courts be Empowered to Review EU Secondary Law?’ (2010) 35 EL Rev 326, 
Johanna Engström, ‘The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection after the Lisbon Treaty’ 
(2011) 4 Review of European Administrative Law 53, Anthony Arnull, ‘The Principle of 
Effective Judicial Protection in EU Law: an Unruly Horse?’ (2011) 36 EL Rev 51 and 
Sacha Prechal and Rob Widdershoven, ‘Redefining the Relationship between “Rewe-
effectiveness” and Effective Judicial Protection’ (2011) 4 Review of European 
Administrative Law 31. 
257 Case C-432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v Justitiekanslern 
[2007] ECR I-2271. 
258 It does not mention Article 41 of the Charter, but it does take account of the Charter as a 
legal source. 
259 Unibet (n 257), paras 17–18. 
260 ibid, paras 3–9. 
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court questioned whether this system was compatible with EU law, and 
decided to refer questions to the ECJ on the compatibility of Swedish law 
with the effective protection of individual’s rights. It also asked whether the 
requirement of effective legal protection required the Swedish courts to 
provide interim relief, in the sense of disapplying national legislation in 
relation to an individual, thus making it possible for him or her to exercise 
the sought right until the dispute is settled.261 
The court reformulated the question to address whether the effective judicial 
protection of an individual’s right required the possibility to bring a 
freestanding action for examination of the compatibility of national 
legislation with EU law.262 The court then once again held that the principle 
of effective judicial protection is a general principle based on constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, and is enshrined in Articles 6 and 
13 of the ECHR. Not surprisingly, the court made reference to Johnston and 
Heylens – but it also held that the principle had been reaffirmed in Article 
47 of the Charter.263 The ECJ then continued by stating that it is for national 
courts to ensure ‘judicial protection’ of an individual’s rights under EU law, 
and clarified that the obligation stems from the principle of sincere 
cooperation in, what is now, Article 4(3) TEU. Interestingly, the court in 
this regard made reference to its case law on the principle of effectiveness, 
citing Rewe, Comet, Simmenthal, Factortame I and Peterbroeck.264 It thus 
seems like the court viewed the principles of effective judicial protection 
and effectiveness as one and the same, or at least that the principle of 
effective judicial protection, which the case concerned, is one part of the 
principle of effectiveness, indicating that the latter is a wider principle 
governing judicial protection in general.265 
The court then confirmed its classic formula from Rewe, stating that in the 
absence of harmonising EU rules the domestic rules shall apply, and that EU 
law is not intended to create new remedies before national courts.266 Thus 
far, the court verified and clarified which set of rules were still good law, 
and therefore should be applied. In the subsequent paragraph, however, the 
court went further and introduced an exception to the no new remedies-rule 
by stating that if no remedy existed at all, meaning that it would be 
impossible, even indirectly, to secure EU rights in national courts, Member 
States were obliged to introduce a suitable remedy.267 
261 ibid, para 30. 
262 ibid, para 36. 
263 ibid, para 37. 
264 ibid, para 38. 
265 Groussot and Wenander are of the opinion that the principle of effectiveness ‘constitutes 
a clear emanation of the general principles of effective judicial protection.’, see Xavier 
Groussot and Henrik Wenander, ‘Self-standing Actions for Judicial Review and the 
Swedish Factortame’ (2007) 26 Civil Justice Quarterly 376, 383. 
266 Unibet (n 257), paras 39–40. 
267 ibid, para 41. 
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The court further on in its reasoning widened that exception from applying 
only to situations where it would be completely impossible to secure EU 
rights to also include situations where an individual has to subject 
themselves to criminal or administrative procedures, risking penalties, in 
order to have the compatibility of national law with EU law examined. 
When adding this additional exception the court clearly marked that it had 
left the reasoning of Rewe, and instead elaborated on the principle of 
effective judicial protection,268 clearly indicating that it saw the principles as 
separate and leading to different conclusions. 
In regard of the question concerning interim relief, the court relied on 
Factortame I and Zuckerfabrik 269  to find that the principle of effective 
judicial protection  
must be interpreted as requiring it to be possible in the legal 
order of a Member State for interim relief to be granted until the 
competent court has given a ruling on whether national 
provisions are compatible with Community law, where the grant 
of such relief is necessary to ensure the full effectiveness of the 
judgment to be given on the existence of such rights.270 
However, when concerned with proceedings seeking to evaluate national 
legislation’s compatibility with EU law 
the grant of any interim relief to suspend the application of 
[national] provisions until the competent court has given a ruling 
on whether those provisions are compatible with Community 
law is governed by the criteria laid down by the national law 
applicable before that court, provided that those criteria are no 
less favourable than those applying to similar domestic actions 
and do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult 
the interim judicial protection of those rights.271 
In situations such as that in Unibet the court thus subjected the national 
legislation to its well established test of equivalence and effectiveness. 
5.2 Case C-268/06 Impact 
Impact272 arose in Ireland in a dispute between governmental employees and 
the ministries within which they were employed. The workers were so-
268 ibid, para 64. 
269 Joined cases C-142/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik SüderdithmarschenandZuckerfabrik 
Soest [1991] ECR I-00415. 
270 Unibet (n 257), para 77. 
271 ibid, para 83. 
272 Case C-268/06 Impact v Minister for Agriculture and Food, Minister for Arts, Sport and 
Tourism, Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Minister for Transport 
[2008] ECR I-2483. 
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called unestablished civil servants, claiming that they were being 
discriminated against due to not having as beneficial terms of employments 
as so-called established civil servants. 273 The special court in which the 
applicants had filed their complaint was prohibited from applying EU law 
directly. Since Ireland had not transposed the relevant directive into national 
law, it was thus impossible for the applicants to rely on their rights 
conferred by EU law in the special court. The Irish government, however, 
pointed out that the applicants could have brought their claim before regular 
courts – either against the government as an employer or, in an action for 
damages sustained as a result from the government’s failure to transpose the 
directive correctly and would therefore have access to an effective judicial 
remedy. 274 The national court halted the proceedings and decided to refer 
questions to the ECJ, one being whether EU law in general, and the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness in particular, required that the 
special court in question could apply EU law directly.275 
The court approached the question by initially stating that the Member 
States have the freedom to choose the ways and means of assuring that a 
directive is transposed in time, but that this freedom does not liberate them 
of their obligation, under the principle of sincere cooperation, to ensure that 
EU law is effective.276 That responsibility also applies to national courts, 
which are responsible ‘to provide the legal protection which individuals 
derive from the rules of Community law and to ensure that those rules are 
fully effective.’277 The court then referred to Unibet in confirming that the 
principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of EU law, 
before repeating its standard paragraph from Rewe, establishing that in the 
absence of harmonising EU law it is for the Member States to designate 
courts and lay down procedural rules.278 It then, again, referred to Rewe and 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, stating that they 
embody the general obligation on the Member States to ensure 
judicial protection of an individual’s rights under Community 
law, apply equally to the designation of the courts and tribunals 
having jurisdiction to hear and determine actions based on 
Community law.279 
The court concluded that a failure to comply with the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness is ‘liable to undermine the principle of 
effective judicial protection’.280 The court found that if it would result in 
procedural disadvantages, for example additional costs, duration of the 
process, it would be a breach of the principle of effectiveness to require the 
273 ibid, para 18. 
274 ibid, para 38. 
275 ibid, para 36. 
276 ibid, para 41. 
277 ibid, para 42. 
278 ibid, para 44. 
279 ibid, para 47. 
280 ibid, para 48. 
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applicants to bring their claims to a general court. This was due to the fact 
that the Irish government had assigned special courts as the competent 
courts to deal with proceedings such as those at hand. 281 
In Impact the court thus applied a different line of reasoning compared to 
that of Unibet. Nevertheless, it did not revolutionise its reasoning and relied 
much upon established sources confirming that the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness, as laid down in Rewe, are still good EU law. It also linked 
them to the principle of effective judicial protection, applying them as the 
test of whether the EU law requirement of effective judicial protection was 
met, thus implying that there is no substantial difference between them. At 
the same time, the court stated that a breach of the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness was liable to undermine the principle of effective judicial 
protection – indicating that there is a difference between them, albeit 
perhaps a semantic one. 
5.3 Joined Cases C-317/08 to C-320/08 
Alassini 
The court had a chance to revisit its judgment in Impact two years later in 
Alassini282. The case originated before Italian courts in a dispute between a 
number of consumers and their telecommunications provider. Since tele-
communications is an area of law regulated by EU secondary legislation, the 
dispute fell within the scope of EU law. According to the applicable national 
law, all disputes of the arisen kind had to be sent to a dispute settlement 
body before it could be tried in courts. The dispute settlement body had 
thirty days to decide upon an outcome, if they did not the case could be 
referred to court. Once the dispute settlement body had reached an outcome 
its decision could be appealed to courts, irrespective of when the decision 
was adopted.283 
In the case at hand, however, the dispute settlement body had not been 
established, prompting the applicants to bring their action to a general court. 
There, the defendants argued that the action was inadmissible, since it had 
not been tried before a dispute settlement body.284 The national court took 
the view that even if the settlement procedure had been set up where the 
applicants live, its mandatory character raised questions about the system’s 
compatibility with EU law. Consequently, it halted the proceedings in order 
to refer questions to the ECJ. In essence, the national court asked whether or 
not EU law, including Article 6 ECHR, precluded national legislation 
281 ibid, para 51. 
282 Joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08 Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA (C-317/08), 
Filomena Califano v Wind SpA (C-318/08), Lucia Anna Giorgia Iacono v Telecom Italia 
SpA (C-319/08) and Multiservice Srl v Telecom Italia SpA (C-320/08) [2010] ECR I-2213. 
283 ibid, paras 2, 13, 16, 54 and 55. 
284 ibid, paras 18–19. 
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providing for a mandatory dispute settlement system before access to court 
is granted.285 
The court approached the question under a headline titled ‘The principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness and the principle of effective judicial 
protection’. With a reference to Impact it then confirmed the Rewe-formula, 
stating that it, in the absence of harmonising EU legislation, is for the 
Member States to designate courts and procedures governing actions based 
on EU rights. It continued by stating that the Member States, in doing so, 
must comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 286 
Interestingly, the court then proclaimed that the requirements of equivalence 
and effectiveness ‘embody the general obligation on the Member States to 
ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under EU law’.287 
Following that statement, the court engaged in a substantive evaluation 
finding that the principle of equivalence had clearly not been breached,288 
and that it was true that the mandatory settlement procedure did influence 
the exercise of rights conferred by the Directive at hand.289 The court did 
not, however, find that the particular settlement system being disputed was 
such as to render it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise 
rights derived from EU secondary legislation. 290  The court pointed to 
several reasons for this, including that the outcome was not binding on the 
parties, that the procedure did not cause substantial delay for the purposes of 
bringing legal proceedings, that the time limit for Bringing proceedings was 
paused during the thirty-day period and that the settlement procedure was 
free of charge.291 
After having stated that it is for the national court to ascertain that the 
settlement procedure fulfils some additional criteria, such as providing for 
interim relief when necessary, the court found that the Italian system did 
comply with the principle of effectiveness as well. 292  Given the court’s 
description of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness as the 
embodiment of the general obligation to ensure judicial protection one may 
have expected this to be the end of the judgment, but it is not. Instead, the 
court continues its reasoning by evaluating the principle of effective judicial 
protection. 
It stated that the principle of effective judicial protection is a general 
principle of EU law, enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and 
confirmed by Article 47 of the Charter. It then held that the mandatory 
dispute settlement procedure introduced an additional step before access to 
285 ibid, paras 20–21. 
286 ibid, paras 47–48. 
287 ibid, para 49. 
288 ibid, paras 50–51. 
289 ibid, para 52. 
290 ibid, para 53. 
291 ibid, paras 54–57. 
292 ibid, para58–60. 
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courts, and that that extra condition might prejudice implementation of the 
principle of effective judicial protection. The court also stated that 
fundamental rights are not absolute, and can be restricted if the restriction is 
justified by a general interest pursued by the measure, and the restriction is 
proportionate.293 
In its application of this legal test, the court found that the aim of providing 
a quicker and less expensive settlement of disputes, as well as lightening the 
burden on the court system, were legitimate objectives in the general 
interest. It also found that the system did not seem disproportionate, given 
its features. The court furthermore agreed with Advocate General Kokott294 
on the point that no less restrictive means existed, since imposing a 
voluntary system of dispute resolution settlement would not be as effective 
in assuring the aims of the procedure.295 The court concluded by stating that 
‘it must be held that the national procedure at issue in the main proceedings 
also complies with the principle of effective judicial protection’.296 
In spite of the court’s reference to Impact it seems to have adopted a rather 
different approach in regards of the relationship between the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness on the one hand, and the principle of effective 
judicial protection on the other. The judgment seems to confirm that the 
requirements of equivalence and effectiveness are linked to a wider concept 
of judicial protection, as the ECJ held that they embody the general 
obligations of Member States in this regard. Yet, by separating its reasoning 
into two different parts, prescribing two different, albeit similar tests, the 
court draws a clear distinction between the two sets of principles. The order 
of the reasoning also raises questions about their relationship. If viewed as 
part of the same substantive matter, the difference being that the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness are wider it would suffice to examine 
whether or not there was a breach of them. In other words, how can there be 
a breach of the narrower principle if the much wider principles are complied 
with? This indicates that a more proper view of the relationship between the 
principles would be to see them as a spear, where the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness are the base, providing general stability, and 
the principle of effective judicial protection is the tip – penetrating the skin 
of national procedural autonomy much deeper. 
293 ibid, 61–63. 
294 Joined cases C-317/08 to C-320/08 Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA (C-317/08), 
Filomena Califano v Wind SpA (C-318/08), Lucia Anna Giorgia Iacono v Telecom Italia 
SpA (C-319/08) and Multiservice Srl v Telecom Italia SpA (C-320/08) [2010] ECR I-2213, 
Opinion of AG Kokott, para 47. 
295 Alassini (n 282), para 65. 
296 ibid, para 66 (emphasis added). 
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5.4 Case C-279/09 DEB 
Nine months after delivering Alassini the court continued to develop its 
reasoning, this time in DEB297, a case stemming from Germany. DEB was a 
company seeking legal aid in order to be able to bring an action against the 
German state for damages, due to the state’s failure to implement secondary 
legislation. DEB claimed that the neglect of the German State had caused 
them substantial damage and lack of income. As a corollary, it had no 
resources to bring an action for damages, since the German national 
legislation required that everyone who wishes to bring such actions must 
make a necessary advance payment of court costs. In addition to those costs, 
the national legislation also demanded that parties were instructed by 
lawyers in court, a cost that DEB could not pay for either.298 
The national court of first instance refused to grant legal aid, since the 
conditions of national law were not fulfilled. According to national case law 
there had to be a public interest that could only exist if the decision affected 
a sizeable population of the business community, or was liable to have 
social repercussions. The national court of appeals agreed with the court of 
first instance that this was not the case in the proceedings at hand, but also 
found that the national legislation might be such as to make it in practice 
impossible or excessively difficult to seek state liability. It therefore decided 
to refer a question to the ECJ asking whether this was the case. The national 
court, in other words, asked a straightforward question on whether or not the 
national system was compatible with the principle of effectiveness.299 
The ECJ approached the question by clarifying that the Rewe-formula still 
applied, and in that context referred to both Unibet and Impact.300 After 
summarising the question, the court changed focus, and stated that since  
[t]he question referred thus concerns the right of a legal person 
to effective access to justice and, accordingly, in the context of 
EU law, it concerns the principle of effective judicial protection. 
That principle is a general principle of EU law stemming from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 
(‘the ECHR’)301 
The court thus acknowledged that the principle of effectiveness is still good 
law, but that matters concerning the right of a legal person to effective 
297 Case C-279/09 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010] ECR I-13849. 
298 ibid, paras 14–17. 
299 ibid, paras 18, 20 and 25. 
300 ibid, para 28. 
301 ibid, para 29 (emphasis added). 
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access to justice in EU law should instead be measured against the principle 
of effective judicial protection. In this regard, the ECJ referred to among 
other cases, Johnston, Heylens and Unibet – but it notably did not refer to 
Article 47 of the Charter in this context, as it had done in both Unibet and 
Alassini.302 
Instead, the court engaged in a separate analysis of Article 47 of the Charter, 
stating that since the Charter has the same legal value as the Treaties, it is 
important that it is taken into consideration in regards of fundamental 
rights.303 It then confirmed that Article 47(2) corresponds to Article 6(1) of 
the ECHR.304 It subsequently held that 
[i]n the light of the above, it is necessary to recast the question 
referred so that it relates to the interpretation of the principle of 
effective judicial protection as enshrined in Article 47 of the 
Charter, in order to ascertain whether, in the context of a 
procedure for pursuing a claim seeking to establish State 
liability under EU law, that provision precludes a national rule 
under which the pursuit of a claim before the courts is subject to 
the making of an advance payment in respect of costs and under 
which a legal person does not qualify for legal aid even though 
it is unable to make that advance payment.305 
Thus, the court did not only reformulate the question, it also held that it was 
necessary to do so. 
Relying on the legal explanations to Article 47 of the Charter, the court then 
confirmed that account is not just to be taken of the wording of the ECHR, 
but also to the case law of the ECtHR.306 It then made reference to such case 
law307 in finding that there is an obligation to provide legal aid where the 
absence of aid would make it impossible to ensure an effective remedy. 
However, ‘[t]hat provision must be interpreted in its context, in the light of 
other provisions of EU law, the law of the Member States and the case‑law 
of the European Court of Human Rights’308, indicating that the ECHR is just 
one part of the legal system as a whole.309 
302 ibid. See also Alassini (n 282), para 61 and Unibet (n 257), para 37. 
303 DEB (n 297), para 30. 
304 ibid, paras 31–32. 
305 ibid, para 33 (emphasis added). 
306 ibid, para 35. 
307 Airey v Ireland (n 234). 
308 DEB (n 297), para 37. 
309 This complex legal context governed by several layers of law has been aptly described 
by an analogy to several overhead-slides lying on top of each other. If one is moved it 
changes not just the image on that slide, but also the image as a whole. See Angelica 
Ericsson, ‘The Swedish Ne Bis in Idem Saga – Painting a Multi-Layered Picture’ (2014) 
Europarättslig Tidskrift 54. 
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The court then continued to evaluate the facts of the case against the case 
law of the ECHR and the Charter.310 It found that it is apparent from ECtHR 
case law that it is not impossible to grant legal aid to legal persons, but that 
it must be assessed in the light of the applicable legislation and the situation 
of the legal person.311 In the light of its reasoning the court’s conclusion was 
that it was not impossible for DEB to rely on the principle of effective 
judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, and that legal 
aid granted as a consequence of this may cover exemption from advance 
payment of court costs and/or the instructions of a lawyer.312 It was left to 
the national courts to decide upon whether the national legislation for 
granting legal aid constituted a limitation on the right of access to court, 
which undermines the very core of effective judicial protection. National 
courts were also entrusted with conducting an evaluation of possible 
justifications and of conducting a proportionality test, should they find that 
the national conditions constituted a breach of the principle of effective 
judicial protection.313 
The case of DEB raises several questions on the relationship between the 
principle of effectiveness and the principle of effective judicial protection, 
but it also clarified a great deal. Firstly, it clarified that Article 47 of the 
Charter is to be taken into account in regards of fundamental rights. It also 
provided clear guidance on how to utilise the legal explanations of the 
Charter in interpreting rights, stating that it is to be taken into account. 
Through its substantial analysis, the court also exemplified how to operate 
within the complex legal field of fundamental rights that are governed by 
national, EU and ECHR-provisions as well as ECHR-case law. 
In regard of the relationship between the principles of effectiveness and 
effective judicial protection DEB becomes of great interest when contrasting 
it against Impact and Alassini. In the latter, the court provided a link 
between the principles, both through its application of them and through 
statements about their relationship. In DEB the court muddied the waters by 
rephrasing a clear question on effectiveness, turning it into a question of 
effective judicial protection. This clearly indicates that the application of the 
principles should differ, based on the circumstances at hand. The court 
simply stated, as its motivation for reformulating the question, that it was 
due to the fact that a legal person was seeking effective access to justice. It 
did not clarify the underlying reasons for why this should be done, nor did it 
contrast situations in which the principle of effective judicial protection 
should be utilised against situations in which the principle of effectiveness 
should be utilised. 
310 DEB (n 297), para 38–44. 
311 ibid, para 52. 
312 ibid, para 59. 
313 ibid, para 60. 
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5.5 Case C-93/12 Agroconsulting 
The most recent case in which the ECJ addressed the principle of effective 
judicial protection and the principles of equivalence and effectiveness in 
detail was delivered in June of 2013. Agroconsulting 314  concerned 
agricultural aid sought by a farmer in Bulgaria. The application for aid was 
denied in a decision adopted by the competent administrative body, and 
upon appeal of the decision the question of which court had jurisdiction 
arose. According to national law, it was the court where the administrative 
body had its seat that had jurisdiction in matters such as those in the case. 
The applicant had, however, brought charges in the court where he resided. 
That court considered itself to be unauthorised to initiate proceedings, but 
before dismissing the case it decided to refer questions to the ECJ of 
whether or not the national rules were compatible with the principles of 
effectiveness and effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the 
Charter.315 
The ECJ reformulated the question slightly, to concern the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness and Article 47 of the Charter. 316  It then 
repeated that in the absence of harmonising EU law it is for the legal system 
of each Member State, in accordance with the principle of national 
procedural autonomy, to designate the national courts having jurisdiction. 
Quoting Impact and Alassini, the court held that Member states nonetheless 
have the responsibility to ensure that rights derived from EU law are 
effectively protected. It also confirmed that the national procedural 
autonomy of Member States is limited by the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness, in accordance with Article 4(3) TEU. 317  The court also 
confirmed its test from Peterbroeck and van Schijndel 318  on how the 
compatibility of national legislation with the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness is to be conducted. It confirmed that the national legislation 
‘must be analysed by reference to the role of the rules concerned in the 
procedure viewed as a whole, to the conduct of that procedure and to the 
special features of those rules, before the various national instances’.319 
After providing guidance on how to interpret the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness in regard of the particular circumstances at hand, mostly 
by pointing out relevant factors to be considered, the ECJ left it to the 
referring court to carry out the evaluation of whether the national law was 
precluded by EU law.320 
314 Case C-93/12 ET Agrokonsulting-04-Velko Stoyanov v Izpalnitelen direktor na 
Darzhaven fond «Zemedelie» - Razplashtatelna agentsia [2013] OJ C225/28. 
315 ibid, paras 24 and 33. 
316 ibid, para 34. 
317 ibid, paras 35–36. 
318 See section 2.3 above. 
319 Agroconsulting (n 314), para 38. 
320 ibid, paras 47 and 58 respectively. 
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The court’s reasoning then clearly left the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness and instead turned to Article 47 of the Charter. With 
references to Johnston and Unibet the court held that Article 47 of the 
Charter is a reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection that 
has its foundation in constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
as enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR. The court concluded that in the 
case at hand ‘it does not appear that an individual in a position such as that 
of Agrokonsulting is deprived of an effective remedy before a court with a 
view to defending rights derived from European Union law.’321 Therefore, 
Article 47 of the Charter did not preclude the national legislation at hand.322 
Agroconsulting thus confirms that the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness are still valid law, that their content has not changed since the 
entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, and that they should be utilised by 
applying the test from Peterbroeck and van Schijndel. It also confirms that 
the principle of effective judicial protection is closely linked to Article 47 of 
the Charter, albeit that the court did not repeat its wording from DEB, 
stating that the principle of effective judicial protection is enshrined in 
Article 47. Instead, it stated that the principle of effective judicial protection 
is reaffirmed in Article 47. 
The judgment in Agroconsulting did not cast a great deal of clarity on the 
relationship between the principles of equivalence and effectiveness on the 
one hand, and the principle of effective judicial protection on the other. 
Overall, the court’s reasoning followed that in Impact and Alassini, clearly 
separating the two sets of principles, thus confirming that they are separate. 
From the court’s application of first the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness, and subsequently Article 47 of the Charter it can be concluded 
that there are situations where both the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness and the principle of effective judicial protection apply 
simultaneously. 
In its application of the principle of effective judicial protection the court 
stated that it concerns situations where an individual is deprived of an 
effective remedy before a court, indicating that the principle of effective 
judicial protection is more concerned with individual fundamental rights 
than with the effectiveness of EU law. The principle of effective judicial 
protection is, however, only addressed in two paragraphs of the judgment, 
making it hard to draw clear and certain conclusions from the reasoning. 
321 ibid, para 60 (emphasis added). 
322 ibid, para 61. 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter summaries and elaborates the analysis and conclusions made in 
the previous chapters. In order to provide clarity it follows the structure of 
the research questions set out in the first chapter. 
6.1 Question 1 a) 
Is there any difference between the principle of effective judicial protection 
on the one hand and the principles of equivalence and effectiveness on the 
other? 
When addressing this question it should first be stated that the ECJ’s 
interpretation of what the principle of equivalence entails is clear. Its 
substantive content has not evolved much since it was first presented in 
Rewe and Comet. It operates like a principle of non-discrimination, 
preventing Member States from treating rights established by EU law less 
favourable than similar rights in national law. The ECJ’s development of the 
principle of equivalence has, as described in section 2.4, been fairly 
uncontroversial. For instance, the ECJ has now clarified how national courts 
should address situations where no comparator exists in national law 
(Palmisani), and that the more balanced approach developed by the ECJ in 
van Schijndel and Peterbroeck, seeking to reconcile respect for national 
procedural autonomy with the effectiveness of EU law, also applies to the 
principle of equivalence. 
The ECJ has instead been struggling with the principle of effectiveness. 
Here, a more substantial evolvement has taken place. The definition of the 
principle, as defined in Rewe, was initially that national legislation could not 
make it virtually impossible for individuals to ascertain rights derived from 
EU law. That is a mild criterion, leaving a lot of leeway to the Member 
States. However, in San Giorgio the ECJ widened the principle of 
effectiveness’ scope of application to also include situations where it is not 
virtually impossible to ascertain EU rights, but merely excessively difficult. 
It is true that the different ‘waves’ of case law have addressed the principle 
of effectiveness differently, emphasising either national procedural 
autonomy or the full effectiveness of EU law, but the basic criteria of virtual 
impossibility or excessive difficulty of evoking EU law is still valid law, as 
confirmed by the ECJ in more recent cases such as Impact, Alassini and 
Agroconsulting. The principle of effectiveness can thus be described as a 
threshold principle, providing a bottom limit for national procedural 
autonomy, preventing Member States from making it too difficult to evoke 
EU law, but still leaving them a considerable margin of discretion in 
deciding how to organise their procedural systems. 
The principle of effective judicial protection has often been used by the ECJ 
in relation to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. As described 
above, the confusion between the principles seems to have arisen due to the 
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similar features of the principle of effective judicial protection and, mainly, 
the principle of effectiveness. However, it is clear when analysing the case 
law of the ECJ that the principle of effective judicial protection and the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness are different principles that 
should not be bundled. 
One reason for clearly separating them is that they have a different legal 
basis. The principles of equivalence and effectiveness are based on the 
obligation of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU, and have been 
developed by the ECJ from there, without being specifically codified. The 
principle of effective judicial protection on the other hand, is based on 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and the ECHR. 
Their different legal basis is reason enough to separate the principles, but 
there are also other reasons. 
Firstly, the ECJ itself distinguishes them apart. The most obvious case is 
DEB where the ECJ deemed it necessary to reformulate a question 
concerning the principle of effectiveness so that it instead addressed the 
principle of effective judicial protection. In finding the necessity to 
reformulate the question, the court implicitly acknowledged that the 
principles are different. 
Moreover, when examining the case law relating to the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness, and that relating to the principle of effective 
judicial protection, it becomes clear that the level of scrutiny by the CJEU 
they entail is different. The principles of equivalence and effectiveness are 
closely related to national procedural autonomy, and therefore leave the 
Member States a greater room for manoeuvre compared to the principle of 
effective judicial protection. The requirements listed in Rewe, requiring that 
the national legislation cannot make it virtually impossible or excessively 
difficult to ascertain rights stemming from EU law, are lenient towards the 
national legislation. In contrast, it is clear from cases such as Johnston and 
Heylens that the principle of effective judicial protection warrants a more 
detailed examination of national legislation. In those cases, the ECJ carried 
out an extensive examination of the national legislation at hand and did not 
leave much margin of discretion to the national courts. What is more, in 
Heylens, the ECJ explicitly stated that the national laws in question were 
inconsistent with EU law, leaving the national court no room for 
interpretation. 
As pointed out by Sacha Prechal and Rob Widdershoven there is also a 
difference in the very nature of the principles of effectiveness and effective 
judicial protection. 323  When analysing cases on the principle of 
effectiveness, it is clear that it imposes negative obligations on Member 
States, meaning that national courts are obliged to disregard conflicting 
323 Sacha Prechal and Rob Widdershoven, ‘Redefining the Relationship between “Rewe-
effectiveness” and Effective Judicial Protection’ (2011) 4 Review of European 
Administrative Law 31, 41. 
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legislation. When analysing cases on effective judicial protection, a trend of 
positive obligations on Member States can instead be identified, meaning 
that Member States are obliged to introduce new legislation that fulfils the 
requirements of effective judicial protection. In cases such as Heylens and 
Unibet the ECJ went so far as to use the principle of effective judicial 
protection so as to oblige Member States to introduce new, and appropriate, 
remedies in cases where the national procedural systems did not already 
entail them. Similarly, in Impact, the court held that a rule prohibiting the 
applicant from being heard in a specialised court was incompatible with the 
principle of effective judicial protection, even though it was not impossible 
or excessively difficult for the applicant to evoke EU law before a general 
court. However, in this regard it should be pointed out that there are cases 
contradicting this division. In Francovich324 for instance the ECJ relied on 
the principle of effectiveness to require Member States to introduce a 
remedy where none existed under national law, and set out explicit 
substantive conditions for that remedy.325 
Still, there is a great deal of confusion regarding the relationship between 
the principle of effectiveness and the principle of effective judicial 
protection, both in the doctrine and in the relevant case law. There are cases 
in which the ECJ could easily have reached the same conclusion 
independently of which principle it would have utilised. The ECJ has 
provided some guidance on the relationship between the principles of 
effectiveness and effective judicial protection, but ambiguities remain. In 
cases such as Impact and Alassini, the ECJ muddied the water by first 
stating that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness embody the 
general obligation of judicial protection – and then stating that a breach of 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness means but a likely breach of 
the principle of effective judicial protection. 
Another important issue still to be resolved by the CJEU is when to apply 
the principle of effective judicial protection instead of the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness. In this regard, the ECJ has provided very 
limited guidance in DEB, by deeming it necessary to reformulate a question 
on the principle of effectiveness so that it instead addressed the principle of 
effective judicial protection. The reason for reformulating the question from 
the national court was said to be that it concerned ‘the right of a legal person 
to effective access to justice’326. That finding would suggest that issues 
relating to access to court needs to be evaluated under the principle of 
effective judicial protection instead of under the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness, or under both sets of principles for that matter. Given the 
wording and case law on Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6(1) ECHR it 
makes sense to apply the principle of effective judicial protection to 
324 Joined case C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v 
Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-05357. 
325 See Michael Dougan, ‘The Francovich Right to Reparation: Reshaping the Contours of 
Community Remedial Competence’ (2000) 6 European Public Law 103, 106. 
326 Case C-279/09 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010] ECR I-13849, para 29. 
 63 
                                                 
situations concerning access to courts. However, it does not follow from that 
conclusion that the principle of effectiveness should therefore be 
disregarded. Rewe itself concerned time limits making it impossible for the 
applicants to argue their cause in courts, as did other cases on the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness, such as Emmott. In these situations, it 
would therefore seem more appropriate to follow the ECJ’s approach in 
Alassini and Agroconsulting where it applied both the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness and the principle of effective judicial 
protection. 
In its recent case law, the ECJ has thus provided the contours of the 
principle of effective judicial protection, but full clarity on its relationship to 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness cannot be found without 
further guidance from the ECJ. 
6.2 Question 1 b) 
How do the codifications of the principle of effective judicial protection 
relate to the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and effective judicial 
protection? 
It is clear from Alassini, DEB and Agroconsulting that the principle of 
effective judicial protection is confirmed by, enshrined in, and reaffirmed by 
Article 47 of the Charter. Therefore, it is not surprising that the ECJ tends to 
begin its evaluation of issues related to effective judicial protection by 
investigating Article 47. Even though neither the wording of Article 47 nor 
the legal explanations to the Charter mention the principle of effective 
judicial protection, the rationale behind equating them is logical. Through 
Article 6(3) TEU and Articles 52(3) and 53 of the Charter there is a clear 
link to the ECHR, meaning in this context a link to Articles 6(1) and 13 of 
the ECHR. Such a link was established by the ECJ already in Johnston and 
Heylens, making it settled case law. 
It is thus safe to say that the principle of effective judicial protection is 
codified in Article 47 of the Charter. However, this does not preclude it 
from coinciding also with other statutes, and the question thus remains 
whether Article 47 is the only codification of the principle of effective 
judicial protection. 
Notably, Article 47 of the Charter does not explicitly grant a right to be 
heard. It does mention the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal, 
which of course can be said to presuppose a right to be heard. On the other 
hand, Article 41 of the Charter explicitly mentions that right, raising 
questions as to whether the presupposed right to be heard in Article 47 is in 
fact codified in Article 41. There is no clear answer to be found in the case 
law of the ECJ yet, but the court has recently clarified that Article 41 is of 
general application, a conclusion contrary to the wording of the Article, 
making this interpretation possible. 
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There are also more substantive reasons indicating a link between Articles 
41 and 47 of the Charter. In Heylens the ECJ engaged in a review of the 
administrative system that governed the recognition of diplomas from other 
countries. The court found that effective judicial protection presupposed an 
administrative procedure that fulfilled certain requirements, in the case at 
hand the obligation on an administrative body to state reasons for its 
decision. Even though the fundamental issue of the case concerned access to 
court, which is a key feature of Article 47, there thus seems to be a link 
between the requirement of effective judicial protection in Article 47 and 
the obligation of good administration in Article 41. 
The relationship between effective judicial protection and Article 19(1) 
TEU is also in need of clarification. It is true that effective legal protection, 
by its wording is different from effective judicial protection, but the 
differences should not be overestimated. One natural interpretation of legal 
protection would be to define it as an obligation on Member States to adopt 
legislation that clearly governs procedures and remedies, thus ensuring legal 
certainty by making rights clear and easy to access information about. This 
definition could be contrasted against the principle of effective judicial 
protection, which governs the access to, and procedure in, courts and 
tribunals. In this view, effective legal protection in Article 19(1) TEU would 
be a preventive principle, upholding rights before a breach occurs. The 
principle of effective judicial protection would, in contrast, be a safeguard 
once a breach has occurred. 
Thus far, the ECJ has only dealt with Article 19 TEU in five cases. However, 
there is an earlier link between the principle of effective legal protection and 
the principle of effective judicial protection, stemming from Rewe and 
confirmed in Simmenthal, Peterbroeck and Impact. In those cases, the ECJ 
used the principle of sincere cooperation to find that national courts are 
obliged to ensure effective legal protection that individuals derive from EU 
law. First after having made clear where the responsibility lays, the court 
continued with its reasoning concerning the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness, or the principle of effective judicial protection. Against that 
background, Article 19(1) TEU seems to be a mere codification of the 
responsibility following from the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 
4(3) TEU. 
It should also be pointed out that the ECJ has hinted that there is a more 
profound connection between effective judicial protection and Article 19(1) 
TEU. In Inuit, the court held that the principle of effective judicial 
protection is ‘reaffirmed by the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) 
TEU’ 327 . The court did not elaborate further on the meaning of this 
reaffirmation, but it is logical to draw the conclusion that effective legal 
327 Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament, Council of 
the European Union, Kingdom of the Netherlands, European Commission [2013] 
OJ C344/11, paras 100–101. 
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protection, as codified in Article 19(1) TEU, forms part of the principle of 
effective judicial protection. 
In sum, it is clear that the principle of effective judicial protection has been 
codified by Article 47 of the Charter. Through the explicit link to the ECHR 
in the EU treaties, it is clear that Articles 6(1) and 13 ECHR also codify the 
principle of effective judicial protection. There is not yet enough case law to 
say with certainty whether it has also been codified by Article 41 of the 
Charter and Article 19(1) TEU, but such a conclusion seems to be consistent 
with previous case law from the CJEU. 
6.3 Question 2 a) 
Which is/are the purpose(s) underlying the principle of effective judicial 
protection? 
The purpose underlying the principle of effective judicial protection has 
been described in relatively clear terms by the CJEU. Already in von 
Colson, but even more so in Johnston and Heylens the ECJ emphasised that 
the protection of individual fundamental rights is the purpose for the 
principle of effective judicial protection. It did so both explicitly, in its 
reasoning, and implicitly, through its reference to the ECHR, linking 
effective judicial protection to Articles 6(1) and 13 ECHR. This conclusion 
has been confirmed in recent case law, such as Agroconsulting. 
Since the principle of effective judicial protection is closely connected to the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness, it is also of interest to examine 
whether or not the latter introduce other objectives that may influence the 
ECJ’s reasoning. 
It is clear from cases such as Simmenthal that the purpose of the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness is the effective application of EU law. 
This, of course, often coincides with the protection of the rights of 
individuals. Nial Fennelly sees this, and the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness, as part of a larger system for ensuring the overall 
effectiveness of EU law, including the principles of supremacy, direct effect 
and conform interpretation.328 It is obvious that the application of EU law in 
national courts will be more effective if not just the EU institutions, but also 
the whole population of the EU oversee the Member States in this regard. 
The case law on the principle of effectiveness, however, is ambivalent in 
this regard. Already in Rewe the ECJ stated that there is an obligation on 
Member States to protect the rights that citizens derive from EU law. The 
ECJ later confirmed that obligation in Peterbroeck, with a clear reasoning. 
This indicates that the ECJ had dual purposes for introducing the principles 
328 Nial Fennelly, ‘The National Judge as a Judge of the European Union’ in Allan Rosas, 
Egils Levits and Yves Bot (eds) The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: 
Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2013) 69. 
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of equivalence and effectiveness, both ensuring the effectiveness of EU law 
and the protection of individual rights. Any further evaluation of whether 
the ECJ saw the protection of individual rights as a purpose in itself, or 
viewed it merely as a way to provide individuals with a tool for ensuring the 
effective application of EU law can only be speculation. 
Even if the purposes underlying the principles of effectiveness and effective 
judicial protection coincide to some extent, it is likely that the CJEU will 
emphasise the effectiveness of EU law as the objective of the principle of 
effectiveness in future case law. The ECJ, of course, had its reasons for not 
abandoning the principles of equivalence and effectiveness in recent cases, 
such as Alassini and DEB, even though it could have relied solely on the 
principle of effective judicial protection to reach the same conclusions. One 
reason could be to keep a tool that it has full and exclusive control over. As 
mentioned, the purpose behind effective judicial protection is not to ensure 
the effective application of EU law, especially since the ECJ is bound by 
Article 53 of the Charter to respect the case law of the ECtHR as a 
minimum level of protection. Should a situation occur where the interest of 
effective application of EU law does not overlap the interest of protecting 
individual rights, it is to be assumed that the ECJ would wish to keep a 
judicial tool through which to protect the application of EU law. 
6.4 Question 2 b) 
Is the ECJ adequately protecting this/these purpose(s) in its case law? 
It is hard to draw conclusions on the adequacy of the ECJ’s effective 
judicial protection of individual rights. In one sense, the ECJ is clearly a 
force for improved judicial protection since there is still case law where 
national legislation is deemed not to live up to the requirement of ensuring 
effective judicial protection. In addition, the link between ECHR and EU 
law in this area empowers the ECJ to safeguard EU-rights corresponding to 
rights in the ECHR. Given the considerable caseload and subsequent long 
handling times that burdens the ECtHR, a potentially quicker way of 
ensuring effective judicial protection has become available for individuals 
via the ECJ. Furthermore, the entry into force of the Charter has increased 
the interest and the focus on fundamental rights adjudication in the ECJ, 
which also indicates that the ECJ’s role as a judicial guardian of effective 
judicial protection will become increasingly important. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ should be criticised for its unclear reasoning 
regarding effective judicial protection. As described, the ECJ has not yet 
addressed a number of crucial issues relating to the principle of effective 
judicial protection, in spite of plenty of opportunities to do so. When is it to 
be applied instead of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness? What 
exactly does it entail? Is Article 47 of the Charter the only codification of it, 
or should statutes such as Article 41 of the Charter and 19(1) TEU also be 
taken into consideration? 
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The lack of clarity impairs legal certainty, both for individuals seeking to 
secure their rights under EU law and for Member States, seeking to fulfil 
their obligation to ensure effective legal protection. In this regard, the basic 
features of the EU judiciary system should once again be recalled. 
Ultimately, EU law is not enforced by the CJEU. Its effectiveness is assured 
by national judges in national courts. Vagueness and ambiguity on behalf of 
the CJEU risks a situation where the principle of effective judicial 
protection is not upheld effectively in national courts, and therefore neither 
in the EU. 
The need to map the case law of the CJEU, and the codifications of 
important principles developed there has been the purpose of this thesis. To 
draw attention to the abovementioned discrepancies in the case law of the 
CJEU, and to the potential risks that they entail, is the significance of the 
thesis. 
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